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Any significant move to consolidate and strengthen—
institutionally and personally—our relationship with Southeast 
Asia, and to make this a clearer and stronger element in 
the overall narrative of our foreign policy, certainly need 
not and should not come at the expense of our established 
relationships with the United States and China, and with 
Japan and South Korea, or of neglecting the need to rapidly 
further develop our relationship with India. 
It is a matter simply of recognising that in the world as it is, 
and as it is becoming, nothing is static; that all of us need 
as many close friendships as we can; and that for Australia 
there is much to be gained, and nothing to be lost, by making 
much more of the friendships we already have with our 
immediate northern neighbours. 
The argument is essentially 
that Australia would be more 
comfortably placed to navigate a 
course between our superpower 
military ally and our emerging-
superpower major economic 
partner if we had a stronger 
identity as a strategic and 
economic partner with our 
Southeast Asian neighbours, and 
could shrug off once and for all 
the lingering perception around 
Asia that we see one of our central roles in the region as 
playing ‘deputy sheriff’ to the United States.
What the report proposes is really a natural continuation of 
the kind of role that Australia was building with ASEAN—
and especially Indonesia—during the Hawke-Keating 
governments, but which diminished somewhat during the 
Howard years and has not yet fully recovered under Prime 
Ministers Rudd and Gillard. As Foreign Minister from 1988 to 
1996—the period in which we played a key partnership role 
in such initiatives as the creation of APEC and the ASEAN 
Regional Forum, and negotiating peace in Cambodia—I had 
no counterparts anywhere in the world with whom I felt more 
close and comfortable than my ASEAN colleagues, despite 
the multitude of cultural and historical factors notionally 
dividing us.
I remember in particular one occasion during a break in a big 
Jakarta meeting on Cambodia when, looking for a quiet place 
in which to make a phone call, I inadvertently stumbled into 
a room where half a dozen ASEAN ministers were chatting 
over coffee: my profuse apologies were overborne by calls to 
stay and join them, with one colleague saying, memorably, 
‘Come on in. You’re one of us.’ One senses that on issues of 
current policy salience for Australia, like taking forward the 
Bali Process to put in place once and for all effective regional 
arrangements for the processing of asylum seekers, life 
would be a little easier if we could recreate something like 
that sentiment.
FOREWORD GARETH EVANS 
Professor the Hon Gareth Evans AC QC FASSA  
is Chancellor and Honorary Professorial Fellow at  
The Australian National University. 
This is a thoughtful, thoroughly researched and lucidly written report making a 
compelling argument: that in the present evolving and uncertain regional geostrategic 
environment, Australia would be wise to be a little less overwhelmingly preoccupied 
with the United States and China, and to become rather more focused on consolidating 
our position closer to home by developing stronger, closer and more multidimensional 
relationships with ASEAN and its key member countries. 
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International economic policy should be opportunistic. We 
trade where we can, we invest where profits are good and we 
encourage foreign investment in a non-discriminatory way.
Australia’s political and security policies on the other hand will 
always be built around Southeast Asia. The ASEAN countries 
are in our immediate neighbourhood. For them, Australia is 
a political and strategic factor as much as they are to us. For 
the major North East Asian countries, Australia is a bit player; 
a good economic partner, a solid ally of America’s but not in 
and of itself an essential player in the security environment of 
the North West Pacific.
So first and foremost, outside of the world of commerce, 
Australia needs an ASEAN strategy. Already it has the 
essential foundations of a strategy. Australia has traditional 
links with ASEAN. Leading figures in Singapore and Malaysia 
have been educated in Australia, we enjoy the historic 
security link with those two countries through the Five Power 
Defence Arrangements, our relationship with Indonesia has 
the depth that neighbours need to accord to each other 
and we have a record of successful engagement in recent 
decades with Indo China. We are also an active participant in 
regional institutions that are driven out of ASEAN, institutions 
like ASEAN PMC, the ARF and the East Asia Summit.
Put another way, Australia will build influence and 
effectiveness in the region if it can first and foremost 
consolidate itself with ASEAN. All the great powers of the 
world are heavily engaged with fast-growing and populous 
China and India. For India we are an Indian Ocean littoral 
country but for China we are far away. Russia is next door, 
the EU is barely further than Australia and America is a 
superpower. But for ASEAN, we are the neighbour—Western, 
affluent, successful and on balance friendly and helpful. 
That’s where our regional diplomatic strategy should start. 
From there we can more successfully build outwards.
All countries, with the possible 
exception of the United 
States, engage with their own 
geographical neighbourhoods 
as a matter of foreign policy 
priority. In Australia’s case, our 
neighbourhood defines not just 
our security but has been a 
central driver of our economy. 
Australia has done well in Asia 
over the past three decades. Our 
businesses have prospered in 
all of Asia’s growing economies and at every stage of their 
development. We have become important players in regional 
institutions from APEC and the ASEAN Regional Forum to the 
East Asia Summit and the Asia Europe Summit. 
Australia should move past the glib generalisations about 
“engaging with Asia”. Asia is not homogeneous. It has none 
of the cohesion which in recent times has brought Europe 
together in the European Union. There are still buried beneath 
calm exterior old rivalries that need to be tamed and gradually 
overcome. There are wide cultural differences not just 
between North East Asia, South Asia and Southeast Asia but 
within those regions.
Australia needs to understand this complex geopolitical 
environment when it sets its policies towards Asia.
Secondly, Australia should have a clear vision of what it wants 
from the region. When it comes to economics, diplomacy 
should focus on where the best short-to-medium-term trade 
and investment opportunities lie. These days, the public 
economic discourse is about China. That makes sense 
because it is our largest trading partner. But the largest Asian 
investor in Australia is Japan; yet its investments are less than 
half that of either the US or the UK. India and Indonesia may 
grow into major economic partners and Singapore already 
is. But as we discovered in 1997–8, if Asian economies dip, 
Australian companies will hunt for opportunities outside the 
region. 
FOREWORD ALEXANDER DOWNER
Professor the Hon Alexander Downer  
is United Nations Special Envoy to Cyprus and  
Visiting Professor of Politics and International Trade  
at The University of Adelaide.
If Australia’s regional diplomacy is to continue to succeed, it needs to be built 
around a thorough knowledge of the region and a coherent plan for engagement. 
No serious commentator or observer of Australian foreign and security policy  
would quibble with the truism that Australia’s engagement with Asia is a  
central priority. 
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This report argues that Australia’s engagement with that part 
of Asia closest to us—Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Singapore, 
Malaysia and the other seven nations of ASEAN)—is 
fundamental to how we operate internationally. Knowing this 
region, working with it, debating with the different countries 
there—and being seen internationally to be focused in this 
way—enhances Australia’s wider influence in Asia and 
beyond. Working from an Australia-Southeast Asia base will 
help us to adjust politically to the dramatic rise of China. It 
also makes Australia a more valuable United States ally. 
 
The ‘Asian century’ is moving us into challenging territory—
presenting enormous opportunities but also considerable 
risks and potential threats. This is true for all nations in the 
Asian region but perhaps especially so for Australia, given 
our particular history and culture. We have watched, as others 
have, the relative decline of United States power and the rise 
of China. Should the US attempt to counter the perceived 
Chinese challenge? Can the two powers agree to work 
together? How would the Asian region change with the return 
of an historic Chinese sway?
Faced with such uncertainty, many Australians continue to 
seek security in our long-established United States alliance. 
But a new era demands a new strategy—one that seeks 
to change our international personality, our international 
narrative. We need a strategy that changes the way we view 
ourselves and how others view us. Seventy years ago we 
looked beyond our British connection and towards the United 
States. Now we talk increasingly of a ‘deeper and broader 
engagement’ with Asia, to use the language of the 2012 
Australian Government White Paper, Australia in the Asian 
Century. But how do we go about building such engagement?
This report, the product of an Asialink Commission that 
examined possibilities and challenges facing the Australia–
ASEAN relationship, calls for an ASEAN (or Southeast Asian) 
strategy. This would augment the US alliance and equip and 
define Australia for an Asian century. While the Asian Century 
White Paper refers to ‘initial priorities’ in the region—and lists 
China, India, Indonesia, Japan and South Korea—it does 
not consider how one relationship might be leveraged to 
assist another. Foreign Minister Bob Carr has placed greater 
emphasis on the ASEAN region, certainly in the pattern of his 
ministerial visits. When he speaks of the ‘need to ease into 
habits of consultation with ASEAN as a grouping and with its 
individual members’,1 he prefigures an argument developed 
in this report. Gareth Evans and Alexander Downer as Foreign 
Ministers both tended to place Southeast Asia in the centre of 
our approach to wider Asia.
In highlighting the Australia-Southeast Asia connection, 
this report proposes that Australia adopt a ‘third way’ 
approach—a strategy of leveraging as well as deepening 
our relations with the region of Asia with which we are most 
familiar. This does not mean neglecting or diminishing our 
bilateral relationships with the US, China, or Southeast Asian 
neighbours such as Indonesia. But a strong Australia–ASEAN 
relationship cements us as part of Asia in the Asian century. 
The White Paper says surprisingly little about the value of 
our relationship with ASEAN, and there has been almost no 
mention in subsequent public discussion.
This report is the result of extensive collaboration and 
deliberation by analysts, academics, diplomats and business 
leaders from throughout Southeast Asia and Australia. 
It conveys Southeast Asian as well as Australian views, 
although its primary concern is to advance Australian 
interests. On the basis of the Asialink Commission’s 
consultations with specialists and stakeholders in Southeast 
Asia, there is reason for confidence that an ASEAN strategy 
will attract strong support among ASEAN nations. 
This report identifies a range of advantages that could flow 
from closer engagement with Southeast Asia. Some are 
specific to the Australia–ASEAN relationship; others relate 
to wider challenges, both Asia–Pacific and global. Region-
specific gains are obvious enough: closer cooperation 
on non-traditional security problems such as the illegal 
movement of people, counter-terrorism and transnational 
crime; greater defence collaboration; closer economic ties 
including deeper educational links, regional connectivity, 
energy and environmental sustainability technologies, and 
food security. 
Wider advantages include a greater involvement in Asia’s 
regional institutions and Asian economic development, and 
enhanced diplomatic impact for both Australia and ASEAN, 
even with respect to influencing the vital United States–China 
dynamic.
Stronger engagement with ASEAN faces a number of 
obstacles, for the Asian region and for Australia. The latter 
include Australia’s (largely unjust) ‘deputy sheriff’ image as 
spruiker for America, its perceived lecturing style, differences 
on free trade agreements, the reluctance of Australian 
business to invest in the region, the faltering state of our 
Asian language studies, erratic and sometimes hostile media 
coverage, and the fact that our leadership too seldom profiles 
the region as a national (and natural) partner. Many of these 
obstacles are addressed in the Asian Century White Paper. 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The rise of China, also of India—and most of all the US-China dynamic—has dominated 
recent Australian commentary. These are vital developments, but ones where Australia 
acting alone is unlikely to have much influence. And in thinking of the ‘Asian century’, 
Australian public discussion has been mesmerised by China—deliberating on how best 
to balance our economic dependence on China against our alliance with the United 
States. We have tended to overlook the complexity of Asia.
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The ASEAN institution, for all its strengths in assisting stable 
inter-state relations in Southeast Asia—and in leading 
a broader Asian regionalism—faces challenges to its 
development, and to its unity. The argument in this report, 
however, is not premised on the effectiveness of ASEAN as 
a regional entity. Even in a period of institutional turmoil, 
Australia’s relations with the countries of ASEAN will bring 
strong benefits to our wider international relations. 
Building Australia–ASEAN engagement will make Australia 
a more effective regional player, a clear objective of the 
Asian Century White Paper. From an Asian point of view, the 
Commission heard, it will help to counter the impression of 
Australia as a country somewhat at odds with the region—an 
outsider dependent on the support of a Western major power 
and uncertain of its long-term role in Asia. 
Projecting a stronger connection with Southeast Asian 
countries—our ASEAN consultations suggest—would signify 
a further shift toward Asia, and in a way that enhances 
Australia’s attractiveness to the United States as well as 
China. For Australia, a closer ASEAN involvement carries no 
obvious disadvantages.
The report acknowledges that over the years Australia has 
been making progress with ASEAN on many fronts—in some 
cases creatively—but a priority now is to give this relationship 
sharp and special focus in Australia’s international narrative. It 
needs to be incorporated there, along with the United States 
alliance and our growing economic dependence on China.
This involves government, private sector and community 
action. It also requires domestic and international rethinking 
about how to define Australia’s place in the world. Such 
rethinking calls for sustained political leadership and action.
—
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1 Give the ASEAN region a central place in the Australian 
international narrative, as a natural partner and neighbour—a 
collaborative relationship compatible with Australia’s strategic 
objectives as a United States ally. 
2 Commit credible and sustained resources to lifting 
Australia’s profile in Southeast Asian countries and the 
ASEAN region’s profile in Australia—initiatives here may be 
in commercial, educational, tourist and many other practical 
areas as well as specific people-to-people projects. The 
pattern of ministerial visits should signal the importance we 
attach to ASEAN relations. Sustaining long-term political 
relationships is essential. 
3 Take a whole-of-government approach to ASEAN 
cooperation, with a wide range of Departments seeking to 
establish constructive partnerships in Southeast Asia. In this 
respect, the Department of Defence and the Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade have established strong foundations 
over many decades. Particular attention should now be given 
to Australian collaboration with ASEAN countries in the wider 
regional and international spheres.
4 Establish an annual ASEAN+1/Australia–ASEAN 
meeting at leader level. Although Australia is recognised as 
ASEAN’s first Dialogue Partner, it has not kept pace with some 
other countries in deepening leadership-level ties with ASEAN. 
An example of a leader-level initiative would be to participate 
in the meetings of the East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP–
EAGA)—involving Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and 
Brunei—held on the sidelines of the annual ASEAN Summit. 
5 Continue to develop bilateral relations with individual 
ASEAN countries recognising that ASEAN is not at this stage 
strongly consolidated as a regional community.
6 Work closely with ASEAN where possible in our regional 
endeavours, including in such broader regional institutions 
as the East Asia Summit (EAS), Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 
and the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meetings (ADMM–Plus). 
Strong Australian assistance to the new EAS creation, the 
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA), 
may also bring advantages. Give high profile to such ASEAN 
collaboration. 
7 Formulate carefully Australia’s approach to the East 
Asia Summit, noting that it is to a certain extent in competition 
with ASEAN Plus Three, which some see now as a more 
authentically ‘Asian’ grouping. While giving priority to working 
inside the EAS, it is critical to enhance Australia’s credentials 
in other regional contexts, both multilateral and bilateral. 
8 Explain more widely—in Australia and the ASEAN 
region—the opportunities offered by the ASEAN–Australia 
New Zealand Free Trade Agreement (AANZFTA). The Asialink 
Commission encountered a lack of understanding, or even 
knowledge, of the AANZFTA. Additional bilateral FTAs with 
ASEAN countries may bring real benefits in certain business 
areas: current FTAs with Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia 
(and the negotiating experience gained) are a foundation for 
such new initiatives. 
9 Play a more active part in assisting ASEAN with the 
development of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). Such 
assistance is already underway through AANZFTA provisions 
but needs to be expanded, partly to demonstrate Australian 
governmental assertions about being a ‘substantive power’. A 
stronger role in building the AEC will also help Australia gain a 
deeper knowledge of regional processes and valuable network 
connections. 
10 Assist where possible the building of Australian 
investment in the ASEAN region, noting it is currently low when 
compared with the role of other key international investor 
nations (especially considering our advantage of proximity). 
The 2012 White Paper commits the Government to ‘constantly 
striv(ing) to increase access’ for Australian investment in Asian 
markets. This report suggests the task for Government and the 
private sector is both urgent and challenging. 
11 Investigate the possibility of partnering the Asia region’s 
Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) by making a financial commitment 
to the CMI and assisting in establishing the mechanisms 
through which the CMI might be operationalised when 
required.
12 Expand and develop the Government’s Special Visitor 
Scheme. It has a proven track record of giving future Southeast 
Asian leaders both understanding of, and access to, Australia. 
13 Utilise Track Two dialogues that can help identify new 
areas for Australia–ASEAN collaboration and also help develop 
deeper network relations.
14 Review and then revitalise both language and non-
language teaching relating to ASEAN countries—in the 
university as well as school systems. Indonesian is the only 
Southeast Asian language included in the Asian Century White 
Paper’s list of ‘priority languages’. At least at University level 
it is in the national interest to have a number of departments 
or centres that take responsibility for the study of Thai, 
Vietnamese, Burmese, Tagalog and Khmer. These languages 
are taught in the United States and the United Kingdom. At the 
present time Australia’s position as a world-leader in the study 
of Southeast Asian languages and societies is coming under 
threat.
—
 
LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS
7  THE ASIALINK COMMISSION OUR PLACE IN THE ASIAN CENTURY
How far has Australia gone in developing an ‘Asia strategy’? 
The 2012 Government White Paper, Australia in the Asian 
Century, is quite clear about the need to strengthen 
relationships with ‘countries across the region’,2 and has 
quickly stimulated public discussion on the issue. At various 
times in our history, it should be recalled, we have sought 
ways to stress ‘engagement with Asia’ while giving priority 
to our British and US alliances—and we have sometimes 
used those alliances to advance our influence in Asia. Today 
Australia urges the necessity of a rules-based order to cope 
with regional shifts in power, and we debate whether shared 
US–China primacy in Asia could be an acceptable option for 
Australia and the world. But it is right that we now concentrate 
on what a stronger Australian engagement with Asia might 
involve—on how a specific, Australian ‘Asia strategy’ might be 
structured?
One key issue is how to best engage concerns about where 
in Asia we ought to focus our efforts—how we ensure that 
initiatives in one direction assist (or at least do not damage) 
engagement elsewhere. Such deliberation about an ‘Asia 
strategy’ was the context in which this Commission was 
initiated and researched. This report—drawing upon close 
consultations with senior ASEAN representatives, as well as 
on a range of Australia-based advice—advocates a ‘third way’ 
approach. It puts the view that Australia ought to engage, 
building outwards from the foundation of our Southeast Asian 
relations. This might seem to be an obvious enough pathway, 
given the geographic proximity, but it is one strangely 
neglected in recent policy discussion. 
Closer involvement with the ASEAN region, the Commission 
heard, would be largely welcomed in ASEAN itself. What is 
stressed here, however, is that it is important not only for its 
own sake—though we note the prediction that several ASEAN 
economies are expected to equal or surpass the Australian 
economy in the next decades. The enhancing of relations with 
Southeast Asian countries—and the international profiling of 
this—ought to be the pivotal element in a broader approach 
to the region and the global community. Australia, it is argued 
here, ought increasingly to define itself not just as a valued 
United States ally, but also as a country working closely with  
its neighbours. 
Australia’s ASEAN relations have been examined from several 
perspectives over the last few years. In 2009 a Parliamentary 
Inquiry focused on free trade agreements and how they 
might advantage Australia’s economic and other interests in 
the region. The Inquiry gave prominence to improved labour 
conditions and human rights, the role of Track Two processes 
in Southeast Asia, and non-traditional security issues, such 
as transnational crime, bio-security, counter-terrorism and 
climate change.3 In 2008 an Australian Parliamentary Research 
Paper noted the development of a more positive ASEAN 
attitude towards Australia, particularly in post-9/11 anti-terrorist 
collaborations and shared concerns about China’s ‘continued 
remarkable growth’. It then examined ways that Australia might 
‘help boost ASEAN’s access to markets and relevant technical 
skills’.4 Earlier, in 2004, a Singapore-based study on closer 
collaboration between Australia, New Zealand and ASEAN, 
considered how Australian and New Zealand technology, 
expertise and capital might be better harnessed in the post-
Asian Financial Crisis years (1997–98). The study argued for 
a regional free trade agreement and stressed the need for 
harmonising trade regulations.5
These reports contribute to thinking about Australia’s ASEAN 
engagement, but the Asialink Commission was concerned 
to set ASEAN relations in a broader—regional and global—
framework. It considered not just how to strengthen ASEAN 
relations, but also how to leverage these relations in a wider 
Asia strategy. The report’s approach is also innovative 
in drawing specifically and systematically on expertise 
and perspectives from ASEAN countries. Although the 
Commission’s research and analysis is explicitly Australia-
centred—and concerned primarily to advance Australian 
interests—it is at the same time the product of close 
collaboration with Southeast Asian colleagues. 
—
INTRODUCTION
Although the United States alliance has been vital to Australia for sixty years and will 
continue to be central in Australian foreign policy thinking, the relative waning of United 
States influence against a stronger Asia—and, in particular, a far stronger China—poses 
new regional challenges for Australia. If Australia is not to become a ‘lonely country’ in 
regional terms, we need to deepen our engagement with Asia—but what does a ‘deeper 
engagement’ mean?
METHODOLOGY AND THANKS
The Asialink Commission involved an Australia–ASEAN 
core research group and consultation with Australian 
officials and business people. Consultation with key 
ASEAN representatives included a series of intensive, 
high-level seminars in Kuala Lumpur.
The Malaysian seminars were conducted in cooperation 
with Malaysia’s Institute of Strategic and International 
Studies, with the generous assistance of the Crown 
Prince of Perak, Raja Nazrin Shah, and the Australian 
High Commissioner to Malaysia, His Excellency Miles 
Kupa. (A list of Commission participants can be found in 
Appendix I.)
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Changing region, changing world
1.1 The 2012 Asian Century White Paper, which is eloquent 
in arguing the ‘Asia’ priority for Australia, stresses economic 
opportunity time and again. The idea of being ‘a winner’ in 
our region6 certainly has an appeal for a sporting nation. The 
‘Asian century’, however, brings challenges—and threats—
which need equal attention. The new era has the potential 
to affect us more than many other countries in both positive 
and negative ways. In discussing the new era one European 
leader has observed that after two centuries in which Europe 
and America ‘monopolised global economic activity, the West 
is now being out-produced, out-manufactured, out-traded, 
and out-invested by the rest of the world’. Key international 
companies announce that ‘the majority of their growth will 
come from Asia’.7
1.2 Statistics highlight the profound shift faced by Australia. 
In the early 1950s only some 18 percent of Australia’s 
exports went to the Asia region.8 In 2012 our top four export 
destinations are in Asia—China, Japan, South Korea and 
India—and three of our top five import markets are Asian 
(China, Japan and Singapore).9 In 2011 well over of a quarter 
of our exports went to China. A recently retired Australian 
Ambassador to Beijing has commented that it is ‘hard to 
conceive the possibility of any other country on Earth ever 
replacing China as our top market.’10
1.3 Among the growing Asian economies, China’s rise 
has of course been the most dramatic. The Economist 
predicts that ‘given reasonable assumptions’ China will 
overtake America as the world’s largest economy within ten 
years.11 Some even argue that the China ‘mega-economy’ 
is as ambitious as that envisaged by the 1940s Japanese 
‘Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere’ because both 
ventures entail the reorganisation of ‘the system of political 
economy in East Asia and Southeast Asia that had been set 
up by Westerners’.12 Others are less effusive, cautioning that 
‘China’s economic structure is flawed and fragile’ and that ‘its 
ability to support the global economic and financial system 
are overestimated’.13 Either way, China’s fortunes must have a 
deep impact on global economic power relations.
1.4 India has also experienced a spectacular economic 
surge (though here too there is scepticism). In 2011, India 
was the world’s fourth largest economy after the United 
States, China and Japan and although China is predicted 
to surpass the US by 2020, the latest Wealth Report 2012 
places India as the world’s largest economy by 2050 with an 
estimated GDP of US$89.57 trillion.14 
1.5 China’s research in science and technology has 
risen rapidly—it is now second in the world after the United 
States.15 China’s global share of high-tech manufacturing 
has surpassed Japan’s, rising from 3 percent in 1995 to 
19 percent in 2010. China now manufactures almost 50 
percent of the world’s computers. In both China and India, 
knowledge- and technology-intensive industries accounted 
for around 20 percent of overall GDP in 2010.16
1.6 China and India are modernising their military forces—
China building a ballistic and cruise missile arsenal and an 
aircraft carrier fleet,17 and India successfully testing the Agni-5 
long-range ballistic missile in April 2012.18 Some forecast that 
in 2012, for the first time in modern history, Asia’s military 
spending will have surpassed that of Europe.19 The United 
States insists that the ‘limited transparency in China’s military 
and security affairs enhances uncertainty and increases the 
potential for misunderstanding and miscalculation’.20
1.7 The economic rise of China and India is not the only 
factor in the Asian economic renaissance. Japan remains the 
world’s third largest economic power and has maintained 
a growth rate of 2.15 percent over the last thirty years. 
Much of its strength lies in its extensive global foreign 
direct investment (FDI) and in industrial and technological 
leadership. South Korea in the past forty years—1971 to 
2011—saw average annual GDP growth of 7.40 percent, and 
economic growth in ASEAN continues (as discussed below).
—
The shifting US-China dynamic 
1.8 The changed dynamic between the United States and 
China—evident in economic statistics and military build-
up—was dramatically illustrated in newspapers across Asia 
and the world in August 2011, when US Vice President Biden 
was reported as giving humble assurances to Beijing that the 
United States would meet its debt obligations to China and 
others.21 The Los Angeles Times reported simultaneously that 
a Chinese official was described as chiding the United States 
to ‘learn to live within its means’.22
1.9 Doubt has been communicated about the United 
States’ future military capacity. In 2009 Defence Secretary 
Robert Gates told the Shangri La Dialogue that ‘the US 
commitment to the region was as strong, if not stronger, today 
as it had ever been’ and in 2011 reiterated this assurance.23 
In January 2012, however, it was announced that the US 
PART 1 THE NEED FOR AN ‘ASIA STRATEGY’
The economic and strategic shifts in the region are ‘tectonic’...
Australian security expert at the Asialink Commission 
—
China is not an optical illusion. The Chinese economy has altered trading 
relationships with all countries and its presence is permanent.
Senior ASEAN economic analyst at the Asialink Commission
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defence budget would be reduced by US$487 billion over the 
next ten years,24 and a few months earlier Secretary of State 
Clinton’s expressed concern about the ability of the United 
States to ‘project power in the Asia-Pacific’ also shed doubt 
on the United States’ capacity to commit to the region.25
1.10 The United States remains a serious trade and 
investment partner in Asia, but in relative terms it is clearly 
reduced in importance. A decade or so ago, the United States 
was the leading export destination for ASEAN but by 2009 
it had slipped to third place (behind China and Japan).26 In 
1996 the United States took 18.4 percent of ASEAN’s exports; 
by 2009 it took only 10 percent.27 The US has also slipped in 
its significance to Japan. Having taken 27 percent of Japan’s 
exports in 1995,28 it was taking only 15.4 percent in 2010, 
falling behind China.29 Consider as well the change in FDI into 
ASEAN. In 2001 US FDI was 30.7 percent of total ASEAN FDI; 
in 2010 it had dropped to 11.3 percent. China’s share tripled 
over the same period.30
1.11 The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–98 damaged 
Western prestige—while the Clinton Administration 
responded with ‘little more than platitudes’, Chinese leaders 
‘visibly supported’ their Asian neighbours, demonstrating 
a commitment to the region.31 The Global Financial Crisis 
commencing in 2008 has done further harm to the United 
States’ international standing. There is little talk today of a 
United States-led unipolar world—but rather a growing (and 
often exaggerated) focus on American ‘declinism’.
1.12 Although it continues to be widely accepted that the 
United States will remain a key player in the Asia region, the 
Commission heard numerous comments consistent with 
recent opinion polling. The Pew Global Attitudes project 
reported in 2011, for instance, that in ‘most countries for 
which there are trends, the view that China will overtake the 
US has increased substantially over the past two years’.32 
This is supported by the Lowy Institute’s Indonesia Poll 2012, 
which found that 29 percent of Indonesians surveyed believed 
that China was ‘the current leader of Southeast Asia’; only 18 
percent thought that the US led the region.33
1.13 Shifts in power are likely to result in the reshaping of 
regional political structures. Although there will be elements 
of strategic continuity in the next decades, the point was 
stressed at the Asialink Commission that references to a 
‘new era’ signify more than a rise in fortune on the part of 
one country, and a fall on the part of another. Such change is 
likely to challenge institutions, values and probably our way 
of thinking about state-to-state relations. In a sense the last 
half-century of United States predominance gave Western 
imperialism in Asia a long twilight period. 
Today, regional institutions that China favours (for instance, 
the ASEAN Plus Three process) are rising in importance, 
while those where the United States has been dominant—
such as APEC—are less central for many Asians. For 
example, the increasing importance of ASEAN to Southeast 
Asians was demonstrated in the Lowy Institute’s Indonesia 
Poll 2012, which found that 40 percent of Indonesians believe 
that ASEAN is the most important grouping to Indonesia, 
while only 7 percent thought APEC important.34
1.14 Whether traditional patterns of China relations in 
Southeast Asia—stressing the centrality of what was 
historically the Middle Kingdom—will influence the region of 
the future is a question preoccupying analysts in ASEAN and 
elsewhere. The Commission encountered further questions 
about how long the United States dollar and the English 
language can be expected to remain dominant in a confident 
new Asia. It was recently reported that 24 percent of global 
internet traffic is now in the Chinese language and could 
overtake English by mid-2014.35 Will Western values and 
approaches to human rights, democracy, business culture 
and governance also become less influential? 
—
Australia’s international positioning 
1.15 Putting aside predictions about the future, compare 
Australia’s international context today with what we faced 
sixty years ago, when the United States alliance was forged 
under the ANZUS Treaty (1951). China was emerging from 
civil war and embroiled in the Korean struggle, Japan was 
beginning to recover from comprehensive military defeat, 
India and most of the countries of Southeast Asia were in the 
early stages of nation building. Australia was prosperous and 
stable—a relatively old nation state, with a long experience 
of democratic institutions, a comparatively strong post-war 
economy, a winner in the recent World War, and a close 
friend of the new super-state, America. Despite our positive 
circumstances, some Australians did pause to contemplate 
the long-term significance for their country of the end of 
Western colonialism and the rise of a range of independent 
Asian nation states.36 
General Secretary of the Chinese Communist party Xi Jinping with US Vice  
President Joe Biden, February 2012. Formerly the leading export destination  
for ASEAN, in 2009 the US slipped to third place, behind China and Japan.  
(COURTESY OF ANTONIO VILLARAIGOSA VIA FLICKR)
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1.16 What of Australia’s international context in 2012? As 
described above, our United States ally remains a major 
power—but not a hegemonic power. It knows it must negotiate 
with China in particular. In regional terms, Australia is weaker 
today. Even two decades ago the Australian economy was 
larger than the GDP of the combined ASEAN states. Today, 
our GDP in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms is less than 
that of Indonesia and the Philippines; Thailand and Malaysia 
have economies predicted to reach Australia’s size over the 
next decades (see 2.2). Australia has become dependent on 
Asian markets, and engaged in all manner of practical ways 
with the region (see 1.2)—enmeshed more deeply, to be sure, 
than any other ‘Western’ country. We are on the front line 
economically and strategically. Compare Australia with the 
United States and Germany: while a quarter of our exports 
went to China in 2010, only 7.2 percent of US exports and 
5.7 percent of German exports went to China in the same 
period.37 In comparison with most other Western countries, 
our military, police and other official interaction across Asia is 
already deep—especially with Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea. In 2011 there were 
more Southeast Asian higher education students enrolled 
in Australia than in the United States;38 and more Southeast 
Asian tourists came to Australia as well.39 
Australia’s 2009 Defence White Paper acknowledged 
Australia’s changed position, especially with respect to the rise 
of China. Concerning the ‘pace, scale and structure of China’s 
military modernisation’ it stressed the need to ‘build a deeper 
understanding of China’s security policies and posture’.40 
1.17 Despite the intensity of practical interaction between 
Australia and Asia, the Commission heard that Australia still 
seems uncomfortable in geostrategic and cultural terms in 
its regional positioning. The Asian Century White Paper seeks 
to address this concern and the research for this report 
highlights some specific issues. Our multi-level practical 
interaction with Asia is not profiled strongly enough in the 
way Australia projects itself to the international community. 
For long closely identified with the major Western powers 
in Asia (the United Kingdom and the United States), and 
known to be preoccupied over time with the building of a 
deliberately Western nation state on our continent, Australia’s 
current international persona does not reflect sufficiently 
the real change that has taken place in the country’s Asia 
engagement. When former Prime Minister Rudd, for instance, 
declared (on 4 June 2008) that Australia’s ‘alliance with the 
United States is the first pillar of our foreign policy and the 
strategic bedrock of our foreign and security policy’, he 
chose to capture only one critical dimension of Australia’s 
international positioning. His statement played into the narrow 
and unjust labelling of Australia as a ‘deputy sheriff’. It was 
suggested to the Commission—particularly by Southeast 
Asian participants—that although Australia’s Western liberal 
institutions and values are often considered attractive by 
people in the Asia region, a more explicit image of Australia in 
its regional role needs to be projected internationally. 
The portrayal of Australia as a collaborator and partner with 
Asian countries, it might sensibly be added, ought also to 
be communicated more clearly to the Australian public. 
Broadening the definition of Australia’s ‘strategic bedrock’ 
needs to be an all-of-nation undertaking. 
1.18 Does Australia have an alternative to deeper Asia 
engagement? It might be hoped that the Asian Century White 
Paper will have settled the issue, but it would be unwise to 
underestimate the importance of gaining consensus in the 
wider Australian community. Over the years, there has been 
debate about whether the United States alliance or Asian 
relationships should be given priority. Today it needs to be 
argued that this distorts our national options. There is no real 
alternative. Australia, most would claim, is committed to the 
United States relationship—committed in our defence and 
economic cooperation, in our intelligence sharing, in our 
common values, and in the high public support the alliance 
attracts. Even when the alliance is given this priority, however, 
our relationships in Asia remain paramount. To ensure the 
alliance has substance, one priority for Australia is to be 
effective in the Asia region. That is what the Americans and 
others expect of us.41
—
Options for an ‘Asia strategy’ 
1.19 The issue is not whether, but how to strengthen our 
position in the region. Here it is necessary to recognise the 
diversity and complexity of ‘Asia’ and assess how closer 
engagement with one country can affect the relationship with 
another. Diplomacy, it is true, requires a degree of pragmatism 
and flexibility—but a strategic framework is likely to facilitate 
not hinder successful response to unexpected change. 
PART 1 THE NEED FOR AN ‘ASIA STRATEGY’ CONTINUED
Naval ships from India, Australia, Japan, Singapore and the United States break away after a joint 
manouvre during Exercise Malabar on the Bay of Bengal in 2007. (COURTESY OF MARION DOSS VIA FLICKR)
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1.20 Given Australia’s growing economic relationship with 
China, some Australian commentary suggests Australia 
ought to move closer to China—become ‘China’s long-run 
partner’.42 There can be little doubt that Australia should 
increase the non-economic substance in its China relations 
(something the Gillard Government has been addressing 
in 2012) but policy-makers—and the Australian public—will 
be wary of any initiative that might disrupt Australia’s long-
term United States alliance. On the other hand, the Asialink 
Commission noted—and heard reservations about—the 
option for Australia of a strong enhancement of relations with 
other regional countries close to the United States, especially 
Japan, South Korea and (increasingly) India. 
We have a long record of governmental cooperation with 
Japan, and until recently Japan was also Australia’s major 
trade partner. In 2007 Australia signed the Australia–Japan 
Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (JDSC), paving 
the way for a new level of security cooperation. The 
seriousness of the suspicion operating between Japan and 
China, however, should not be underestimated43—and one 
consequence is that China must inevitably view a further 
firming of Japan–Australia relations with suspicion. Given 
South Korea’s less antagonistic relationship with China, and 
its smaller size, the tightening of our Korea relationship is 
less problematic. The new, rapidly growing India has been 
moving toward the United States in recent years—and we 
have already declared India to be ‘in the front rank’ of our 
‘international partnerships’44—but again, current rivalry 
between India and China would influence Chinese responses 
to closer Australia–India cooperation, especially if this had a 
distinct security dimension. 
1.21 The degree to which Australia’s regional alliances 
must be handled with care was demonstrated when a 
‘quadrilateral initiative’ between Australia, Japan, India 
and the US was mooted in 2006. In September 2007 these 
states carried out joint naval exercises in the Bay of Bengal, 
arousing ‘encirclement’ fears in China, whose foreign ministry 
approached each of the governments involved, demanding 
to know the purpose of the initiative.45 China’s anxieties 
were evident again in November 2011, when an enhanced 
Australia–United States military relationship was proclaimed—
with an anticipated 2,500-strong American military force to 
be stationed in Darwin on a rotational basis by 2016 and an 
increased presence of US B52 bombers visiting Darwin. The 
state-owned China Daily warned that Australia should recall 
its economic dependence on China, adding: ‘If Australia uses 
its military bases to help the US harm Chinese interests, then 
Australia itself will be caught in the crossfire’.46
—
Conclusion—the Southeast Asia path
1.22 Turning to ASEAN (the ten states of Southeast Asia), 
Commission deliberations—including both ASEAN and 
Australian representatives—noted that a deeper Australian 
engagement with this part of the Asia region presents 
real advantages, and certainly less disadvantages, as an 
Asia strategy for Australia. Enhancing and leveraging our 
relations with that part of Asia where Australians have been 
most deeply involved would be a ‘third way’ strategy. While 
Australia’s cooperation with ASEAN and ASEAN countries 
will not necessarily sharpen inter-state suspicions, it offers 
concrete advantages. 
1.23 As this report explains, some gains will be specific to 
the Australia–ASEAN relationship itself; other gains relate to 
wider, regional challenges.
1.24  The possibility of closer Australia–Southeast Asia 
relations—of an Australia–ASEAN collaboration—the 
Commission heard, bears strongly on the question of 
how Australia might best be positioned with respect to the 
emerging Asia. It is arguably the key to an effective Australian 
‘Asia strategy’.
—
 
ASEAN—the oldest regional grouping in this part of the world—is now accepted  
as central in the broader ‘Asian’ regional planning and institution building that is taking 
place at the present time (though questions are persistently asked about how well  
ASEAN ‘drives’ these wider processes).
The Asialink Commission
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What is ASEAN?
2.1 In this report ‘ASEAN’ is used to refer to the countries of 
the ASEAN region (Southeast Asia) as well as to the ASEAN 
organisation itself. The proliferation of regional institutions in 
Asia, some including ‘ASEAN’ in the name, can be confusing. 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations consists of ten 
states situated between the Indian sub-continent and China. 
They differ from one another in striking ways but are gaining 
skill at working together. There are the majority Muslim 
countries, Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei; the Theravada 
Buddhist nations, Thailand, Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos; 
the strongly Chinese-influenced Vietnam; the Chinese-
majority Singapore; and then the largely Christian Philippines. 
Thailand, Malaysia, Cambodia and Brunei are monarchies 
(though of very different types); Indonesia is a new and vibrant 
democracy; Vietnam and Laos are still ruled by communist 
parties; and Myanmar is experimenting with a limited form of 
civilian government after decades of military rule. 
2.2 ASEAN was initiated in 1967 and at that stage included 
only five states: Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and 
the Philippines. Brunei was the next to join in 1984, Vietnam 
in 1995, Myanmar and Laos in 1997, and finally Cambodia in 
1999. Today these ten countries have a combined population 
of 613 million (India has just under 1.2 billion; China 1.3 
billion), and their total GDP is US $2.1 trillion (India’s is US$1.8 
trillion, China’s US$6.98 trillion).47 In 1988 the Australian GDP 
continued to be larger than that of ASEAN (then including only 
five states). By 2050, according to the recent HSBC ‘The World 
in 2050’ report, both the Philippines and Indonesia will have 
larger economies than Australia—and Malaysia and Thailand 
will be close behind.48 Indonesia has already passed us in 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms.
2.3 As a regional grouping, ASEAN has decided not 
to emulate the European Union (EU). ASEAN has limited 
institutionalisation and a strong respect for national 
sovereignty; and the so-called ‘ASEAN way’ stresses 
informality, mutual consultation and consensus in relations 
between member states. Often criticised as slow-moving—and 
vulnerable to serious divisions—ASEAN might nevertheless 
claim to be the most successful regional body after the EU. It 
has been a legal entity since 2008—when the ASEAN Charter 
came into force—and many countries (including Australia 
and the United States) now have Ambassadors to ASEAN. 
One product of ASEAN’s flexibility has been the successful 
incorporation of new member states of differing political 
orientation—in particular, Vietnam, Laos and Myanmar. 
While the ten member states do not always agree, a point 
of overwhelming convergence seems to be the necessity of 
ASEAN. No country has expressed a desire to withdraw. 
2.4  Despite ASEAN’s growing economies, there is still a great 
deal of economic unevenness within the group. Singapore is 
ASEAN’s richest nation, ranked seventh in the World Bank’s 
‘Gross National Income per capita 2011’ list in PPP terms, 
while Cambodia ranks 173 and Myanmar is not ranked at 
all. Australia ranks 33.49 The World Bank’s annual ‘Doing 
Business’ rankings, which measure ease of doing business 
around the world (in terms of the regulatory environment), 
placed Singapore as number one for 2012; Malaysia and 
Thailand were ranked 12 and 18; Brunei was 79; Vietnam was 
99; and the remaining ASEAN countries come in at 128 and 
lower.50 Australia ranks 10. Consider also that Transparency 
International’s ‘Corruption Perceptions Index 2011’ ranking 
countries from the least to the most corrupt found that of the 
ASEAN countries, Singapore was the least corrupt in fifth 
position (Australia was number 8) and Malaysia was ranked 60, 
Thailand 80, Indonesia 100, Vietnam 112, the Philippines 129, 
Laos 154, Cambodia 164 and Myanmar 180.51
2.5 In 2003 ASEAN made an ambitious commitment to create 
an ASEAN Economic Community, an ASEAN Political-Security 
Community and an ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community by 2020. 
Then in 2007 ASEAN leaders resolved to bring forward to 2015 
the establishment of the Economic Community, which includes 
a single market and production base. The Commission was 
told that there are strong doubts about whether this can be 
achieved. The Political-Security Community is hindered by 
carefully-guarded state sovereignty and suspicion between 
member states, but the fact remains that the ASEAN region has 
been remarkably peaceful despite the existence of troubled 
borders and long-term national rivalries. The recent military 
action between Thailand and Cambodia over the long-running 
Preah Vihear Temple dispute is a rare example of inter-state 
armed conflict in Southeast Asia. The temple itself, a UNESCO 
World Heritage site dating back some ten centuries, is also 
a reminder of the civilisational significance of the region—
extraordinary by any international standards.
PART 2 WHY SOUTHEAST ASIA
Singapore ranked number one in the  one in the World Bank’s 2012 ‘Doing Business 
Rankings.’ (COURTESY OF JB LONDONG VIA FLICKR)
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2.6  ASEAN is now widely acknowledged as a leader in 
developing broader regional planning and institution building. 
ASEAN prominence in this regional architecture arises partly 
from the fact that a claim to regional leadership from either 
China or Japan—both of which possess a population and 
economic base larger than ASEAN’s—would be seen as 
provocative by the other. It is also the case, however, that 
ASEAN has shown skill in region building—and that skill 
must be taken into account in a discussion of ASEAN’s 
attractiveness as a partner or collaborator.
—
Working closely with Southeast Asia 
—a natural choice for Australia
2.7 Working closely with the ASEAN region is unlikely to be 
seen as provocative by anyone, including China. Although 
there have been tensions (including military action) over the 
years between some Southeast Asian countries and China—
Vietnam is the most important example historically—in general 
these countries have displayed much diplomatic skill in 
handling China. Like every major power the Chinese, on their 
part, probably value having ‘a footing in their own region’52 
and may feel relatively comfortable in Southeast Asia partly 
because of the superior position China has held in the regional 
hierarchy. In modern times in the difficult period following the 
Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989, China was grateful to 
encounter a degree of sympathy in Southeast Asia and was 
subsequently active in courting Southeast Asia.53 In 2004, 
 ASEAN has, by far, the most developed regional architecture (albeit hub-and-spoke) 
within Asia—especially through its +1 partnerships. Building up engagement with the 
ASEAN ‘hub’ in this line of thinking makes definite sense, especially since it is broadening 
out to include security and defence matters, which have been hitherto taboo.
ASEAN–ISIS specialist at the Asialink Commission
—
The Chinese genuinely want ASEAN to take the lead.
ASEAN participant at the Asialink Commission
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao described China’s attitude 
towards Southeast Asia as that of a ‘friendly elephant’.54 
When the Asian Financial Crisis occurred in 1997–98, China 
demonstrated its commitment to Southeast Asia—and 
exceeded ASEAN expectations—by extending generous 
bilateral support ($1 billion to Thailand; for Indonesia, $400 
million plus $200 million in exports credits), refusing to 
devalue the Renminbi, and subsequently matching Japan’s 
$38.4 billion contribution to the Chiang Mai Initiative (aimed at 
managing short-term liquidity issues faced by countries in the 
region).55 In 2010 China signed a free trade agreement with 
ASEAN, and earlier (in 1999–2000) cooperation framework 
agreements were put in place with all ten ASEAN countries.56
2.8 China is ASEAN’s major trading partner. As at February 
2012, ASEAN’s exports to China were US$113 billion; imports 
were US$119 billion.57 For the period 2008–10 China’s FDI 
into ASEAN was US$89 billion, accounting for 5.5 percent 
of FDI into the region.58 While this is less than Japan and 
US investment into ASEAN in the same period, it is growing. 
China, the Commission heard, needs new regions in which to 
invest to counter its over-exposure to United States debt, and 
is always looking for secure natural resources supply as well. 
In addition, Southeast Asia needs the infrastructure and long 
term, low interest loans that China can provide. 
2.9 There are certainly anxieties in the ASEAN region 
about the rise of China—as discussed later in this report 
(2.34–2.37). Nevertheless, China’s espousal of the idea of 
a ‘harmonious world’ along with its ‘no strings attached’ 
approach to regional affairs—both initially promoted by Hu 
Jintao to foster ‘an Asian spirit in the region’ and ‘promote 
East Asian integration with ASEAN’59—has underpinned its 
positive approach to the ASEAN region, and to the ASEAN 
organisation. Also, China has often (though not always) 
exercised skilful diplomacy in Southeast Asia—taking into 
account the priorities of the different governments (in a 
number of cases simply to retain power) and more often than 
not also identifying the personal interests of leaders.60
2.10 In July 2012, Chinese pressure on Cambodia was 
seen widely to damage ASEAN unity at the ASEAN Foreign 
Ministers meeting in Phnom Penh—when there was failure to 
produce a consensus view on the serious territorial disputes 
in the South China Sea (see 4.46). In general, however, 
the China–ASEAN relationship has been viewed in a more 
positive light in ASEAN countries. On numerous occasions 
ASEAN representatives at the Asialink Commission referred 
to Chinese support for ASEAN in wider region building: 
“China genuinely wants ASEAN to take the lead. So they are 
dismayed about ASEAN divisions”. The Commission was told 
too that “ASEAN and China tend to see issues and values the 
same way”. 
IN THE BOX SEAT
ASEAN has been central in regional architecture 
over the last twenty years: 
1994  ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 
1996  Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) 
1997  ASEAN Plus Three (APT)—China, Japan  
 and South Korea
2005  East Asia Summit (EAS)—ASEAN Plus  
 Three, plus Dialogue Partners India,  
 Australia and New Zealand 
2010  ASEAN Defence Ministers Meetings Plus  
 (ADMM Plus)—all 16 EAS members
2011  The United States and Russia officially  
 joined the East Asia Summit and the ADMM  
 Plus, taking membership to 18 states
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One reason cited to explain China’s support of ASEAN-led 
regionalism, would appear to be the belief that this has the 
potential to ‘help China deal with its sensitive relations with 
Japan and Korea as well as help its wish to bring Taiwan 
back into its fold’.61 In general China has surprised many by 
its support for ASEAN62 and for regional multilateralism in 
general.63 As one observer has noted, it suits China to have 
ASEAN play a key part in developing regional institutions. 
As a ‘third party’, ASEAN leadership is seen by China to be 
preferable to a United States ‘attempt at building an Asia–
Pacific security mechanism’—a mechanism that might, from 
a Chinese point of view, be interpreted as ‘a US-dominated 
strategic straightjacket’.64 
2.11 Although there is a wariness of China in Southeast Asia 
today, China knows it faces there nothing like the suspicion 
that exists in Japan, and even India. A senior Singaporean’s 
view was that, “If we see China as a threat it will be self-
fulfilling”. Another comment was that many in ASEAN see 
attractions in a strong China: it is when China has shown 
weakness, some note, that there has been ‘chaos in Asia. 
When China has been strong and stable, order has been 
preserved’.65 Even those who are keen for other major powers 
to help balance China’s power are likely to observe (in the 
words of an Indonesian official) that “we need China—its 
market, its technology—there is no alternative but to work with 
China”. 
2.12 This relatively positive engagement between China and 
ASEAN is significant in making ASEAN an attractive partner 
for Australia. Summing up the ASEAN strength, a Malaysian 
commented: “Usually when one grouping or another in East 
Asia comes out with suggestions or ideas, hidden motives are 
immediately suspected. A closer Australia–ASEAN grouping 
would not be able to escape such charges totally. However 
it would have a better chance than most, because neither 
Australia nor ASEAN is a major power or perceived by China 
as a serious challenge”. 
2.13 With respect to China’s perception of Australia, we do 
not appear to be treated with immediate suspicion—even 
accepting the special relationship between Australia and the 
United States. The Commission heard the view that China’s 
relations with Australia are not as positive as they generally 
are with ASEAN countries; nevertheless, as one senior 
Singapore official put it in 2011, there is “an advantage for 
ASEAN in working with Australia in that while China sees 
many bogeymen, Australia is not one of them”. The role 
Australia has taken in the 2011–12 United States ‘pivot’ 
toward Asia, it must be said, may have served to modify to 
some extent this judgement.
—
Other nations see value in strengthening 
ASEAN engagement
2.14 At the present time Japan, South Korea and the 
United States have all been enhancing their relations with 
ASEAN. Japanese involvement is longstanding, including 
as a major investor and aid donor—but in 2011 there was 
also an affirming commitment in the announcement of a 2 
trillion yen aid package to ASEAN for ‘development projects 
to strengthen regional integration’.66 Korean government 
ministers have been making more frequent visits to the 
region, an ASEAN–Korea FTA was signed in 2006, trade has 
increased greatly and there is far more Korean than Australian 
investment in the region. From 2009 to 2010, two-way trade 
between South Korea and ASEAN increased 31 percent 
from US$74.7 billion to US$97.29 billion, and ASEAN is now 
the second-biggest trading partner of South Korea after 
China.67 Korean popular culture, it should be added, is highly 
influential in Southeast Asia. 
2.15 The United States’ agreement to join the East Asia 
Summit conveyed America’s acceptance that ASEAN is a 
‘fulcrum for the region’s emerging regional architecture’, to 
quote Secretary of State Clinton.68 Following the November 
2011 Summit the United States was busy building relations 
with Myanmar—recently viewed as a rogue state, but now 
scheduled to take over the Chair of ASEAN in 2014. The 
United States has also been promoting the Trans Pacific 
Partnership (TPP)—begun in 2006 as the Trans-Pacific 
Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement, involving 
Malaysia and Vietnam as well as Singapore and Brunei. The 
TPP aims to further free up both trade and investment among 
member countries, and could be seen to rival specifically East 
Asian economic regionalism led by ASEAN, China or Japan. 
The TPP is seen in some quarters as having significance well 
beyond the economic sphere. In the words of a Japanese 
newspaper headline ‘joining TPP is essential to counter 
expanding China’.69
—
PART 2 WHY SOUTHEAST ASIA CONTINUED
The offical emblem of ASEAN was adopted in July 1997.
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Australia has a positive track record with 
ASEAN countries
2.16 Although forging closer engagement with the ASEAN 
region will meet competition from other nations, Australia 
has a strong (though not often highlighted) network of 
relationships with ASEAN in both the government and 
non-government sectors. As set out in the Parliamentary 
Inquiry into Australia’s Relationship with ASEAN (2009), this 
interaction operates on both a bilateral and a multilateral 
basis, and has been taking place over a long period. The 
Australia–ASEAN record includes supporting Indonesia’s 
independence struggle in the 1940s, and then assisting in 
various ways in the establishing of Malaya/Malaysia over the 
next decade or so. Australia’s lead role in the Colombo Plan—
commencing in 1950 and focusing on human resources 
development—is recalled in influential ASEAN circles; and 
we are remembered positively in some quarters in Thailand 
and the Philippines for our partnership in the Southeast Asia 
Treaty Organisation (SEATO) (1954). Apart from our aid and 
educational role in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in recent 
decades, Australia is recognised as having been effective in 
1991–92 in leading the military component of UNTAC (United 
Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia)—the body tasked 
with restoring civil government to Cambodia.
2.17 Australia was ASEAN’s first Dialogue Partner, meeting 
with the then five states in Canberra in 1974. We were also 
a founding member of the ASEAN-led organisations, the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the EAS and the ADMM Plus. 
There was an ASEAN–Australia Development Cooperation 
Partnership (AADCP) from 2002 to 2008, which addressed 
development issues on a regional basis, aiming to strengthen 
ASEAN as a regional grouping.  
 
The more recent ASEAN–Australia Comprehensive 
Partnership (signed in 2007, and covering the period 2008–
13) has been described as a ‘roadmap for future political and 
security cooperation, economic cooperation, socio-cultural 
cooperation and development cooperation at regional and 
international levels’.70 The Partnership focused not only 
on deeper economic integration, but also on cooperation 
in environmental conservation, disease control, disaster 
preparedness and counter terrorism. It sets out to ‘promote 
deeper mutual understanding of the political systems and 
historical, social and cultural traditions … through increasing 
people-to-people contacts’.71 The ASEAN–Australia New 
Zealand Free Trade Agreement (AANZFTA), brought into 
operation in January 2010, is considered by the Australian 
Government to be our most ambitious trade deal to date. It 
is the first time ASEAN has embarked on FTA negotiations 
covering all sectors including goods, services, investment 
and intellectual property simultaneously. Australia appointed 
an Ambassador to ASEAN in 2008 and the Asian Century 
White Paper has announced that the Ambassador will now be 
stationed in the ASEAN headquarters in Jakarta. 
2.18 In the education sector, apart from the educational 
component of the Colombo Plan, Australia has been an 
Associate Member of the Southeast Asian Ministers of 
Education Organisation (SEAMEO) since 1974. Australia has 
established seven Australian university campuses in Vietnam, 
Malaysia and Singapore, and there has been a steady flow 
of Southeast Asian students into Australia over decades. In 
student numbers, the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade confirms that Australia is today the major provider 
of Western education to Vietnam, Thailand and Malaysia; 
we possess a 35 percent share of the Indonesian market, 
with less than half as many Indonesian students going to 
the United States. Overall, as noted already, there were 
substantially more Southeast Asian students in Australia than 
in the United States in 2010.
2.19 Australia’s two-way trade in goods with ASEAN 
accounted for 13.9 percent ($64 billion) of Australia’s total 
merchandise trade in 2011. This compares with our two-
way trade in goods with China at 23.1 percent ($106 billion) 
and just 7.6 percent with the United States ($30 billion).72 
The ASEAN figures have fluctuated greatly: in 2007–09 the 
region—taken as a whole—was Australia’s largest trading 
partner.73 China overtook ASEAN in 2009 and further 
extended its lead in 2010; nevertheless, as the annual Asialink 
Index (2011) reports, trade with ASEAN increased 5 percent 
in real terms and was valued at $80.6 billion in 2010.74 
Business services trade with ASEAN currently surpasses our 
two-way services activity with China, Japan, New Zealand or 
the United States.75 We are the ASEAN region’s sixth-largest 
trading partner in terms of exports and ranked eighth in terms 
of imports.76 As explained below, Australia is in particular 
ASEAN’s principal source for key agricultural products.
Left: A young Malaysian student looks on in class. There has  
been a steady flow of Southeast Asian students into Australia  
over decades. (COURTESY OF ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK VIA FLICKR)
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2.20  With respect to defence relations, Australia has been 
closely engaged with Malaysia and Singapore through the 
Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) since 1971. 
We engage in the Cobra Gold exercises, which the United 
States holds regularly with Thailand, with participation 
from Singapore, Japan, Korea, Indonesia and Malaysia. 
Australia also conducts exercises with Vietnam and Brunei, 
and engages in officer training programs with these and 
other ASEAN countries. The Lombok Treaty was signed 
with Indonesia in 2006 and provided for bilateral exchanges 
and cooperation on terrorism, transnational crime, law 
enforcement, intelligence-sharing, and maritime and aviation 
security. In 2010 the Treaty was upgraded to include people-
smuggling, and it was resolved to hold bilateral Australia–
Indonesia meetings annually. Australia holds regular defence 
consultations with Vietnam—as well as with Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Singapore.
2.21 Counter-terrorist cooperation was boosted following 
the 2001 Bali bombings, and it has developed in a way 
that demonstrates a genuine deepening of Australia’s 
engagement with Southeast Asian partners. Counter-
terrorist Memoranda of Understanding have been signed 
with Indonesia, Singapore, the Philippines, Malaysia, 
Cambodia, Thailand and Brunei—and the Jakarta Centre 
for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC) (established in 
2004) is an Australia–Indonesia bilateral organisation that 
is now a regional centre for law enforcement with a claim to 
be a global model. The Australian Federal Police (AFP) have 
representatives stationed in Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, 
Cambodia, Vietnam, Myanmar and the Philippines, and in a 
number of cases (including Indonesia) there is a systematic 
sharing of intelligence. Australia became a dialogue partner 
with ASEANAPOL (the Chiefs of ASEAN Police) in 2008 and 
each year senior Australian police officers meet with their 
counterparts at the ASEAN Chiefs of Police Conference.77 
Since 2005, the AFP has also jointly sponsored and run the 
annual Asia Region Law Enforcement Management Program 
in Hanoi (in partnership with the Royal Melbourne Institute of 
Technology) for ASEANAPOL countries.78 
2.22 The Australian Government has established bilateral 
Institutes—aimed at fostering people-to-people links and 
broader understanding—with Indonesia (1989), Malaysia 
(2005) and Thailand (2005); and there are bilateral business 
councils with all ASEAN states except for Cambodia, Laos 
and Myanmar. As well as the multilateral AANZFTA, bilateral 
FTAs are in operation with Singapore (since 2003), Thailand 
(2005) and Malaysia (2012), and FTA negotiations are 
underway with Indonesia. In 2012 the Australian Government 
has been industrious in building relations with the reformist 
government of Myanmar.
2.23 To give an idea of the breadth of interaction between 
Australia and ASEAN countries, the Australian cultural 
heritage network AusHeritage has a formal relationship 
with the ASEAN Committee on Culture and Information 
(COCI) and deals with ASEAN states on a one-on-one basis. 
Australian trade unions maintain relations with ASEAN states 
through the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) and 
the ASEAN Trade Union Council (ATUC). Australian unions 
conduct training and capacity building programs through 
Public Services International (PSI), which has offices in 
Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia. Science and technology 
organisations such as the Australian Academy of Science, 
CSIRO (Commonwealth Science and Industrial Research 
Organisation), ANSTO (Australian Nuclear Science and 
Technology Organisation) and Engineers Australia tend to 
have bilateral links in the region, some of which are supported 
by the Australian aid program AusAID, or through such 
multilateral institutions as the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) and APEC. 
2.24 With respect to Track Two engagement—which is 
highly valued by ASEAN for its capacity to generate both 
key personal relationships and new ideas—Australia 
interacts with the ASEAN–ISIS through CSCAP (Council for 
Security Cooperation in the Asia–Pacific) and PECC (Pacific 
Economic Cooperation Council), and since 2008 there has 
been an annual ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand Dialogue 
convened by ISIS Malaysia (and supported by Asialink). 
The Asialink Conversations have brought together influential 
leaders from ASEAN countries and Australia since 2002. As 
regards academic expertise on the ASEAN region, Australia 
has a high international reputation with important specialist 
concentrations at the Australian National University, Monash 
University, the University of Melbourne and a number of other 
universities.
2.25 In all these areas and more Australia interacts in 
a concrete manner with the ASEAN region—and yet the 
ASEAN–Australia relationship has a high profile neither 
in the region nor in the Australian community. This was 
the impression gained from the consultation with ASEAN 
representatives, and in Australia there can be no doubt that 
when ‘Asia’ is discussed the focus is on China and (less 
often) India, rather than ASEAN and the Southeast Asian 
countries. The Australian Asian Century White Paper is the 
most recent demonstration of such prioritising. 
Asialink CEO Jenny McGregor with Dato’ Seri Mohd Annuar Bin Zaini at the Track 2 Asialink 
Conversations in Yangon, Myanmar. (COURTESY OF ASIALINK)
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Most Australians would not see ASEAN as critical to 
Australia’s geopolitical future, and the Commission gained 
the impression that ASEAN leaders know this. One senior 
ASEAN comment to the Commission described ASEAN’s 
relations with Australia as being akin to a “long dependable 
marriage”—an observation that carries more of a warning 
than a reassurance.
—
ASEAN would work more closely with 
Australia
2.26 The Asialink Commission encountered a range 
of ASEAN-region interests in working more closely—in 
immediate practical areas as well as in terms of geostrategic 
diplomacy. In the case of the former, the Commission often 
heard the concern to attract Australian investment and the 
expectation that Australia might help the region’s quest for 
energy and food security. Initiatives in these areas should 
bring their own rewards—but they are also important in 
assisting the process of building a comprehensive and visible 
ASEAN partnership offering a wider regional advantage.
2.27 With respect to economic concerns, it was a constant 
complaint that Australian investment in ASEAN is strikingly 
low, given our proximity to the region—and also at odds 
with our trade levels. ASEAN ranks Australia eighth in FDI 
for the period 2008–1079 and the overwhelming majority of 
that investment goes to Singapore. Korea provides a sharp 
contrast to Australia. With an economy roughly the same size 
as Australia’s, in 2010 South Korea’s share of FDI flow into 
ASEAN was US$5 billion, while Australia’s FDI flow into the 
region was US$2.3 billion80 ($1.163 billion of which went to 
Singapore).81 When compared to our far larger investment 
flows into the United States and the UK in 2010, this raises 
questions for both Australia and ASEAN. 
2.28 A crucial area where Australia’s contribution is sought, 
so the Commission was told, is infrastructure development. 
By ‘infrastructure’ we mean essential facilities, services and 
organisational structures—including the whole range of 
communication utilities—and capacity deficits in these areas 
can of course undermine economic growth. Infrastructure 
development in Southeast Asia was described as “low-
hanging fruit” by one Australian businessman.82 
2.29 Energy security is a further high priority area in which 
a greater contribution from Australia would be welcomed. 
“Energy security”, a leading ASEAN figure told the 
Commission “is the big issue pushing down through China to 
Southeast Asia, and a diversification of sources is desirable”. 
Energy security is perceived to be paramount for sustaining 
economic development in Southeast Asia, and its power 
demand is expected to triple over the next decade.83 Australia 
is well positioned as a source for uranium to Southeast 
Asia where the commitment to develop nuclear power (for 
peaceful means only) remains strong. 
2.30 With respect to food security, the Commission heard 
that Australian agriculture is highly regarded not just to satisfy 
immediate food security needs, but in terms of technological 
transfer.
2.31 The building of the ASEAN Economic Community 
is seen to be moving slowly and here again a greater 
Australian involvement is sought. Current assistance linked 
into AANZFTA—Australia provides a financial contribution 
for technical assistance, especially for the weaker ASEAN 
economies—is appreciated as a concrete contribution, at 
least by those who are aware of AANZFTA. 
2.32 From the perspective of developing regional institutions, 
the Commission was often told that ASEAN welcomes 
Australian support. This was especially valued now in the East 
Asia Summit context, because ASEAN is nervous about the 
developing consequences of Russian and United States entry 
in 2011. It is in such institutions as the East Asia Summit that 
ASEAN seeks to ‘socialise’ China and now, presumably, the 
United States. This is seen as a vitally important process, and 
one in which Australia could become a valuable collaborator. 
In thinking about cooperation with Australia in regional 
institutions, a number of ASEAN representatives suggested 
that Australia has an advantage in that it is perceived to be 
“less intrusive, less likely to dictate”. The comparison was 
with the United States in particular. Pleasingly, the Asian 
Century White Paper sees the EAS as a forum in which “trust 
and transparency” can be promoted.84
 2.33 In other aspects of the broader regional context, 
ASEAN thinking about ASEAN–Australia cooperation was 
again of interest. Australia’s close relationship with the 
United States is often perceived to offer advantages (as well 
as some difficulties). The Commission heard that in some 
circumstances our access to Washington and to the United 
States business community is viewed as highly useful in 
ASEAN—in particular when ASEAN countries are seeking 
to curry favour with the United States. Also, in enhancing 
Australia’s defence capacity, the alliance—if carefully 
managed—can reinforce our stature in the region. The 
United States-led counter-terrorist campaign that followed 
the September 11 attacks (at least before the invasion of 
Iraq) offered an opportunity for Australia to tighten security 
relations with many countries in the region. The fact that a 
number of ASEAN countries—concerned especially about 
how to handle Chinese concerns and demands—are today 
seeking to maintain a serious United States presence in the 
region, again provides circumstances in which our American 
experience and contacts will be welcomed. It is a mistake, 
therefore, to judge that an Australia without the United States 
alliance would be a more effective operator in the Asia 
region. 
‘Socializing’ refers to the way a group can bring in an outside country, encouraging that 
outsider to internalize the ‘values, roles and understandings’ of the group.
Alastair Johnston, ‘Socialization in International Institutions’, 200385
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2.34 The China factor—which was constantly discussed in 
the Commission consultations—presents strong opportunities 
for Australian engagement. The Commission heard much 
ASEAN comment about hedging and socialising with respect 
to China—and Australia is perceived to have a potential role 
here. There is anxiety at present about the dramatic rise of 
China; as noted already, this does not usually involve open 
hostility, but there is an expressed concern about the possible 
extent of Chinese dominance. The contest in the South China 
Sea is important—with Chinese claims conflicting with those 
of Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei—and there 
is tension in the Mekong region, with China announcing in 
November 2011 its intention to send armed river patrols into 
Laos, Thailand and Myanmar.86 There is also a degree of 
nervousness—in some countries more than others—about 
growing Chinese investment in ASEAN. In Cambodia, China 
accounts for 50 percent of inward investment and its ‘vast 
presence’ is seen by some to risk ‘turning the country into a 
vassal of the Middle Kingdom’.87
2.35 Chinese-funded transport and energy corridors also 
cause concern, and lead ASEAN countries to look for 
additional partnerships. China is poised to provide much 
more funding to the region in this area. In November 2011, 
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao offered Southeast Asia US$10 
billion in infrastructure loans, extending the US$15 billion 
worth of loans offered to the region in 2009. The ASEAN–
China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA) will also stimulate 
Chinese infrastructure development in the region. 
Chinese infrastructure projects, however, tend to be oriented 
towards China. The Kunming-Shanghai railroad is a much-
cited example. It is planned to reach down—vertically—from 
Kunming to Singapore through Myanmar, Thailand and 
Malaysia—and then extend east, through Vietnam into Laos 
and Cambodia. Australian involvement in infrastructure 
development, it is argued, can help create ‘horizontal’ 
corridors across the region.
2.36 The great increase in ASEAN–China trade—especially 
following the ACFTA implemented in January 2010—has 
caused concern rather than celebration in some ASEAN 
quarters. It has been reported in China that under the ACFTA, 
the two-way China–ASEAN trade had by August 2010 already 
leapt 47 percent, reaching US$185.4 billion.89 The Chinese 
vice minister of commerce has expressed confidence that by 
2015 ASEAN–China trade will reach $500 billion.90 A senior 
Thai diplomat told the Commission that in his country there 
are a “lot of complaints about Chinese products flooding the 
market”. The same complaint is heard from Indonesia, where 
local companies find it difficult to compete with such imports 
that ‘sell at lower prices and with reasonable quality’.91 
Greater trade with Australia would assist ASEAN’s search for 
balance.
2.37 It was in the security context that the Commission 
frequently heard the terms ‘hedging’ and ‘socialising’ in 
reference to Southeast Asian responses to China—and 
here again Australia is perceived as being able to play a 
greater part. The decision of Brunei, Singapore, Vietnam 
and Malaysia to engage with the United States in the Trans 
Pacific Partnership (TPP) could be seen as an example of 
hedging. Bringing the United States into the East Asia Summit 
is another example. The fact that Malaysia has begun to 
join multi-nation military exercises with the United States 
is a further case.92 Security relations with Australia can be 
understood to enhance this hedging action. 
2.38 Closer ASEAN–Australia cooperation, the Commission 
heard, would broaden ASEAN’s international ties without 
being directly provocative toward China. Enhancing Japanese 
engagement, for instance, can be more problematic. At one 
level the November 2011 Japanese financial commitment 
to infrastructure development is welcomed—but it is almost 
inevitably viewed in terms of a direct contest with China,93 
something which tends to trouble ASEAN representatives. 
The Japanese involvement seems to go beyond hedging—
especially when (as happened) the Japanese announcement 
sets such funding assistance in the context of freedom of 
navigation in the South China Sea, and Japanese media 
commentary makes a further direct link to Japan–China 
tension in the East China Sea.94
‘Hedging’ refers to ‘behaviour in which a country seeks to offset risks by pursuing 
multiple policy options that are intended to produce mutually counteracting effects, 
under the situation of high uncertainties and high stakes.’
Kuik Cheng-Chwee, ‘The Essence of Hedging’, (2008)
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2.39 By contrast, ASEAN-region commentators have 
tended not to see Australia as specifically anti-China—nor 
do they see China as directly hostile towards Australia. We 
have had success, they consider, in being able to foster a 
strong relationship (particularly in the economic sphere) 
with China, while maintaining a critical, long-term United 
States relationship. Such perceptions, it must be said, 
changed somewhat in November 2011, with the Australian–
United States agreement to deepen military relations—an 
announcement that provoked vigorous criticism from China. 
2.40 In supporting a closer engagement with Australia, 
ASEAN representatives spoke with an enthusiasm that 
surprised some of the Australians involved. A Vietnamese 
participant saw Australia as being “more ready than the 
United States to listen to Asia”. There was the suggestion 
too that Australia has the potential to be “a bridge to the US 
(and the EU) in helping to understand ASEAN, and in seeking 
common ways to deal with China”. 
The ‘bridge’ concept has often been alluded to in the past—
but the novelty here was that it was stated with sincerity, 
and by ASEAN participants. A Thai observation was that the 
United States, unlike Australia, has not been “indigenized 
with the region”. ASEAN participants also speculated that 
where ASEAN and Australia are able to “come to a common 
position” they might join together in effective “dialogue with 
China”. Such Commission comments chime with a recent 
observation from ASEAN Secretary General Surin Pitsuwan 
that ‘Australia has identified with us more and more … it is 
warm and cordial, much less distant now, no longer viewing 
itself as a European country stranded in the Pacific’.95 
—
 
The Old Siam Plaza, Bangkok. Southeast Asian trade is oriented more toward China than the United States today. 
(COURTESY OF MARK PARKINGTON VIA FLICKR)
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Identifying areas of mutual strategic 
importance
3.1 Engaging more deeply with ASEAN countries means, 
first of all, being increasingly busy. The list of practical 
initiatives of mutual benefit can grow and grow when 
Australian and ASEAN representatives focus on possibilities. 
Certain proposals are of clear strategic importance, especially 
those that entail cooperating with ASEAN countries to shape 
developments in the wider region. There is an overriding need 
here to remember the importance of presentation, rhetoric 
and symbolism. The vital significance of Australia–ASEAN 
engagement needs to be projected both to the Australian 
public, and to the entire international community. 
3.2 In identifying initiatives that might add substance to 
Australia–ASEAN interaction, there will always be room for 
deeper cooperation in handling the illegal movement of 
people, counter-terrorism and transnational crime, as well 
as in intelligence sharing, professional military training, joint 
military exercises and the standardisation (or at least the 
promotion of mutual understanding) in legislation and legal 
procedures relating to cross-border issues. Good foundations 
for cooperation have already been established in these areas. 
—
Energy
3.3 ASEAN representatives see energy security as 
paramount for sustaining economic development and see the 
need for ASEAN to diversify its sources. The Asian Century 
White Paper gives attention to oil and gas as future ASEAN 
imports.96 Nuclear power plants, a Lowy Institute report found 
in 2010, are being developed or contemplated in Vietnam, 
Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines. Russia 
is assisting Vietnam in developing its first nuclear reactor 
at Ninh Thuan and the United States has also affirmed its 
commitment to Vietnam on civil nuclear power.97 A nuclear 
Southeast Asia offers opportunities and challenges for 
Australia, which has 31 percent of the world’s uranium. 
However Southeast Asia might also go to Kazakhstan, 
which has 12 percent of the world’s uranium supply, or 
Canada or Russia (which each have 9 percent).98 The Lowy 
Institute report argued that, aside from Australia’s option to 
apply conditions to uranium exports, ‘it can also encourage 
and assist safe development and operation of nuclear 
power in Southeast Asia through international and regional 
organisations and established bilateral relationships.’99 
3.4 It is suggested that coal will dominate ASEAN’s energy 
market by 2020 as gas reserves decline100 and Australia 
is the world’s largest coal exporter (250 million tonnes in 
2008). Coal, however, is not among Australia’s major exports 
to ASEAN—in 2008–09 Japan imported 39.8 percent of 
Australian coal compared to 1.3 percent to Thailand and 1.0 
percent to Malaysia.101 Indonesia is not far behind Australia as 
a coal producer (just over 200 million tonnes in 2008) but its 
reserves are expected to be exhausted in eighty years.102 In 
comparison, Australian black coal has more than 100 years, 
and brown coal more than 500 years, of supply.103 
3.5 Juxtaposed with the argument that coal will dominate 
in fulfilling Southeast Asia’s energy needs is the growing 
move against fossil fuels, accompanied by discussions about 
phasing out Australia’s aging coal-fired power plants by 2030. 
How, then, can Australia justify selling coal to Southeast Asia? 
One proposed strategy is, rather than investing in upgrading 
ageing coal-fired power plants in Australia, to link Southeast 
Asia and Australia in a vast high-tech energy grid to create 
‘pan-Asian energy infrastructure’ that works towards replacing 
dependence on polluting ‘dirty energy’ sources. This energy 
grid would utilise a variety of forms of energy including solar 
energy and gas.104 
 3.6 In January 2007 the ASEAN Plus Six countries 
(which includes Australia)—signed the Cebu Declaration 
on East Asian Energy Security, an agreement setting out to 
improve energy efficiency and affordability. One priority of 
the Declaration was to encourage ‘the private sector and 
introduce more investments for energy explorations and 
extraction’.105 
—
Food security
3.7 The Commission heard that Australian agriculture is 
highly regarded not just to satisfy immediate food security 
needs, but in terms of technological transfer. Proximity 
and established relationships are an Australian advantage 
in the agricultural sector, but our leadership in the sector 
cannot be taken for granted. For example, in the wake of 
Australia’s suspensions of its live cattle trade to Indonesia 
in 2011, Indonesia is seeking to reduce its dependence on 
Australian beef.106 Brazil now hopes to ‘supplant Australia’s 
position as Indonesia’s major source of beef, as well as in 
other agricultural cooperation efforts in providing husbandry 
genetics and degraded soil re-utilisation’.107
PART 3 STRENGTHENING AUSTRALIA–SOUTHEAST ASIAN COLLABORATION
ASEAN and Australia are entities that command international respect. Australia is  
a developed country with an excellent record of maintaining democracy and human 
rights. ASEAN is developing as a credible regional grouping and is showing good 
progress in economic development.
Senior Malaysian scholar at the Asialink Commission
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3.8 Technological transfer is certainly underway in 
agriculture. For example, CSIRO informed the Inquiry into 
Australia’s Relationship with ASEAN (2009) that its recent work 
with ASEAN focused on ‘sustainable agriculture, including 
animal diseases and natural resource management issues’.108 
This included assessing the impact of climate change on 
water resources and the productivity of the Mekong Basin, 
and collaborating on diseases such as foot and mouth. 
Funding for CSIRO’s work, the Inquiry was told, came 
from AusAID and the Australian Centre for International 
Agricultural Research. Austrade is also actively pursuing 
avenues for technical exchange. In 2012 it hosted its second 
ASEAN Services and Technology Mission to Southeast Asia 
for Australian businesses with expertise in areas such as 
genetics and breeding, herd management, livestock exporting 
and veterinary services. The first mission in 2011 visited 
Indonesia and Thailand, and the 2012 mission will take in the 
Philippines and Malaysia. Agricultural research and training is 
clearly an area for increased Australia–ASEAN cooperation. It 
is also important that Australia find ways to promote the work 
it does in technology cooperation. China, the Commission 
was told, has far more success in obtaining profile.
3.9 AANZFTA has removed tariffs on imports of some live 
animals, grains, and fertilisers into several ASEAN countries. 
According to Austrade, this means that Australia now has 
‘greater access to increasingly linked supply chains’,109 
although challenges remain in overturning domestic 
regulatory policies in some ASEAN countries. 
3.10 Agricultural exports to Southeast Asia accounted for 
19 percent of Australia’s market in 2010, making ASEAN 
Australia’s top agriculture export market, ahead of Japan, 
China and the United States.110 The value of Australian 
food exports to ASEAN increased 16 percent in 2010–11 to 
$5.7 billion.111 At present, wheat is among Australia’s top 
exports to ASEAN (A$1.452 billion in 2010) and overall, grain 
exports were valued at A$1.7 billion, meat A$654 million 
and dairy products A$646 million. Other key commodities 
were live animal exports, sugar, cotton, beverages and malt. 
ASEAN imports of agricultural products from Australia and 
New Zealand dominate to the extent that ASEAN relies on 
Australia/New Zealand for over 90 percent of key agricultural 
products—live sheep and goat imports, rye and oats—and 
about 89 percent of its beef.112 Australian food imports 
from ASEAN also significantly increased in 2010–11—up 
28 percent to $2.34 billion.113 These are already impressive 
figures, and deserve to be given high profile in official 
communication regarding Australia–ASEAN relations.
3.11 There is good reason for anxiety about any suspension 
or reduction in the live cattle trade. Of the 800,000 live cattle 
exported from Australia each year, an estimated 500,000 
go to Indonesia.114 The Australian Centre for International 
Agricultural Research (ACIAR) is supporting Indonesia in a 
three-year pilot project, launched in April 2011, to improve 
cattle production in East Java and Sumatra.115 The Northern 
Territory Cattlemen’s Association is also engaging in capacity 
building with Indonesia, announcing in April 2012 that it 
was training eight Indonesian agriculture students in animal 
husbandry, animal welfare practices and management 
techniques over six weeks in remote cattle stations.116 
3.12 Given the comments made by ASEAN representatives 
in the Asialink Commission process it is surprising that the 
Joint Statement of the ASEAN–Australia Summit in Hanoi in 
October 2010 made no mention of agriculture as a priority 
and that no specific recommendations on agriculture were 
made in the 2009 Parliamentary Inquiry. The Commission was 
reminded, however, of the 2009 pledge made under ‘ASEAN 
Integrated Food Security Framework and Strategic Plan of 
Action on Food Security in the ASEAN Region 2009–2013’ 
(established in 2008) to embrace food security as a matter of 
permanent and high priority policy. Under this commitment 
the ASEAN leaders agreed to encourage partnerships with 
concerned institutions, agencies, dialogue partners and 
international organisations. 
—
In the wake of Australia’s suspension of live cattle trade to Indonesia in 2011,  
Indonesia is seeking to reduce its dependence on Australian beef.  
(COURTESY OF JOHAN DOUMA VIA FLICKR) 
Energy security is the big issue pushing down through China to Southeast Asia,  
and a diversification of sources is desirable.
ASEAN participant at the Asialink Commission
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Infrastructure development
3.13 The Asian Development Bank claims infrastructure 
development is the number one priority for the region and 
that Asia is lagging behind the rest of the world (see 2.28).117 
The Commission was told that this is a critical area where 
Australian support is welcome.
3.14 The October 2010 Joint Statement of the ASEAN–
Australia Summit announced Australia’s investment of A$132 
million on major infrastructure projects in mainland Southeast 
Asia. AusAID already provides A$57.3 million (2011–12) to 
Cambodia, which includes infrastructure development as a 
priority area, and A$18.83 million (2007–11) to Laos; Vietnam 
receives A$102.4 million (2011–12). These represent joint 
projects with international organisations such as the ADB, the 
World Bank and UNICEF.118
3.15 The question which might be asked here is whether the 
level at which Australia currently engages in such initiatives is 
appropriate. Australian governmental rhetoric can raise high 
expectations—for instance, when Australia’s Ambassador 
to the United States, Kim Beazley announces to the world 
(in November 2011) that Australia is ‘a substantial power … 
an increasingly important power.’119 When one turns from 
such claims to compare the Australian assistance projects 
listed here with the recent Japanese initiative (Y2 trillion), 
or note that Korea has offered infrastructure assistance 
of $500 million to the Philippines alone120—and when we 
take into account the size of the Australian economy—our 
commitments do not appear substantial, or likely to enhance 
Australian influence. 
3.16 The Commission heard the argument that Australia 
should engage in more Private Public Partnerships (PPPs)—
which involve contracts between a public sector authority 
and a private partner—in the infrastructure area. Initiatives 
have already been taken in this regard. For example, in the 
Philippines, Australia is providing approximately A$15 million 
over three years (2011–13) in a co-financing arrangement with 
the ADB (contributing US$7 million), the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) (up to US$4.5 million) and the World Bank 
(up to US$4.5 million). The Philippines is keen to secure PPPs 
to develop airports—the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, a 
city terminal for its Diosdado Macapagal International Airport, 
the new Daraga international airport and two domestic 
airports. New expressways and upgrades to existing 
expressways are also slated for 2011 to 2014. 
—
PART 3 STRENGTHENING AUSTRALIA – SOUTHEAST ASIAN COLLABORATION CONTINUED
INFRASTRUCTURE CAPACITY  
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
• An Asian Development Bank report in 2010 
noted that of the ten ASEAN nations, only 
Singapore and Malaysia could be considered 
adequately developed.
• Less than 60 percent of Southeast Asia’s roads 
were paved in 2006.
• As at December 2011, 77.2 percent of 
Singaporeans and 61.7 percent of Malaysians 
had access to the internet, compared to 
only 33.7 percent in Vietnam, 27.4 percent in 
Thailand and 3.1 percent in Cambodia.
• In Australia, 89.8 percent of the population has 
access to the internet
The outskirts of Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam. In 2006, less than 60 percent of Southeast 
Asia’s roads were paved. (COURTESY OF EMILIO LABRADOR VIA FLICKR)
Infrastructure development in Southeast Asia is  
the low-hanging fruit for Australian investors.
Australian businesman at the Asialink Commission
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Education
3.17 Australia has a respected and established education 
presence in Southeast Asia but there are opportunities to 
strengthen our engagement. These include introducing 
more on-shore educational institutions into the region 
and increasing the number of Australians studying and 
researching in Southeast Asian universities. The Commission 
also heard there would be strong interest in Australian 
involvement in establishing regional universities, identifying 
two specific opportunities:
• The Nalanda University project, which has secured the 
support of the Indian Government under the East Asia 
Summit to promote academic interaction between India, 
China and Southeast Asia, might welcome Australian 
support
• The CIMB ASEAN Research Institute (CARI) (established 
by CIMB, one of Southeast Asia’s largest banks) is 
promoting an ASEAN University, which again, would 
welcome Australian involvement. 
3.18 The developing vocational market in Southeast 
Asia provides obvious opportunities. Although Australia 
already has a strong foothold in this market, it is currently 
crowded and unnecessarily complicated by the fact that 
there are some 142 different providers.121 Demand in this 
area continues to grow and, with better sector coordination, 
Australia could be even better positioned in future than it is at 
present.122 
—
Free trade agreements
3.19 The AANZFTA is described as the most comprehensive 
FTA yet negotiated by either Australia or ASEAN. Although 
Australian officials say the agreement sends a clear message 
to Southeast Asia that Australia wants to work with the region, 
AANZFTA needs to be given prominence and to be widely 
utilised. It offers greater liberalisation and standardisation 
in such areas as import tariffs, rules of origin, investment 
rules, transport arrangements, education standards and 
qualification recognition, as well as increased mobility 
for skilled labour. Despite strong government support for 
the AANZFTA, the Commission was told that business 
utilisation—and even awareness of its existence—is patchy. 
Promotion of this agreement is clearly a priority not just 
for Australia and New Zealand, but also for the ASEAN 
governments.
3.20 Although AANZFTA is subject to the criticisms levelled 
at all FTAs—that they are a diversion away from true 
multilateral reform, that the growing number of FTAs simply 
over-complicates economic relations, and that they favour 
certain sectors—it does appear to bring substantive and 
strategic advantages to Australia. In substantive terms, taking 
into account the way ASEAN is rapidly deepening economic 
ties with China and India, it has the potential to help open 
a ‘pan-Asia’ market to Australian businesses. Leveraging 
AANZFTA—so the Commission was told—Australians 
can gain access to China via the favourable terms of the 
ASEAN–China FTA. Austrade points out that some Australian 
businesses are already establishing bases in Southeast 
Asia—particularly in Singapore and Thailand—for this 
purpose.
3.21 One way in which AANZFTA makes clear Australia’s 
commitment to the region is through its Economic Co-
operation Support Programme. Though small, this Australian 
financial commitment of up to $20 million over five years,123 
includes technical assistance in areas such as developing 
intellectual property regulations and conformity assessment 
procedures, and focuses on the weaker ASEAN economies. 
It is an indication of what might be done at a more ambitious 
level. Such Australian initiatives are welcomed, the 
Commission was told, partly because Australian involvement 
is not seen by China as provocative. 
3.22  Apart from the multilateral AANZFTA, bilateral FTAs 
are in operation with Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia 
(see 2.22), and it is argued that these agreements have a 
particular advantage in addressing country-specific issues. 
Also, the process of negotiation itself deepens understanding 
between the countries concerned. Current FTA negotiations 
with Indonesia deserve high priority—especially given the 
strikingly low level of economic activity between Australia and 
Indonesia. New options would obviously be with Vietnam and 
the Philippines. 
—
The contest between regional agreements
3.23 There are a number of initiatives—CEAPEA, 
EAFTA, TPP, RCEP—to create broader regional economic 
partnerships, and Australia’s response to these competing 
plans is carefully watched. Attention is now focused on the 
new Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), 
but from the perspective of Australia’s ‘Asia narrative’ it is 
likely to be an advantage that the Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership of East Asia (CEPEA) (which had strong Japan-
ese support) was identified by Australia as an important 
initiative in 2010. 
Free trade agreements ... can be substantive or strategic. Substantive FTAs  
are primarily to increase trade volume; strategic FTAs serve a diplomatic function.  
High-income countries can make deep substantive headway, while lesser income  
countries need strategic FTAs. If FTAs are asymmetric, they can be unworkable.  
ASEAN is striving for substantive FTAs.
Southeast Asian economist at the Asialink Commission
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At the EAS Summit of that year, Prime Minister Gillard 
announced the tasking of Australian officials to consider 
further the recommendations of a Track Two Study Group 
on the CEPEA. The Study Group’s Phase II Report, which 
had been released in July 2009, concluded that developing 
the three pillars of the CEPEA—economic cooperation, 
facilitation and liberalisation, and institutional development—
would generate solid benefits for the region. The Asialink 
Commission encountered influential ASEAN support for the 
CEPEA—but the proposal faced the competitive opposition 
of China, which was advocating an East Asia Free Trade Area 
(EAFTA). The latter would be restricted to ASEAN Plus Three 
countries (ASEAN states plus China, Japan, and South Korea). 
China sees the CEPEA ‘as a Japan driven effort to undermine 
China’s position in East Asia by bringing in India.’124 The 
CEPEA had originally been intended to cover the original 
members of the EAS (including Australia, New Zealand and 
India), and it pre-dated the United States and Russia joining 
the EAS.125 The Asialink Commission was also told that since 
the entry of the United States and Russia into the EAS, China’s 
sensitivities towards a CEPEA had increased. 
3.24 Many see the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) as a 
strategic rather than a substantive trade agreement, whereby 
the United States seeks to regain greater economic leverage 
in Asia and attempts to counter China’s already formidable 
economic clout. For Australia, this has posed a challenge in 
terms of where to commit support. One ASEAN economist 
concluded bluntly, “Australia can and should continue to back 
the CEPEA knowing full well that both [the CEPEA and the 
TPP] are non-starters, at least for now. China’s opposition 
could be eroded somewhat as it is feeling a bit at sea, not 
being in the TPP.” As it has turned out, both China and Japan 
now seem to back the Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership (RCEP), an ASEAN-led initiative that tries to build 
on both CEPEA and EAFTA, and would include India, Australia 
and New Zealand.126 Australia has expressed warm support for 
the RCEP,127 and this will be seen as an important contribution 
to building Australia–ASEAN collaboration. 
—
Working within regional institutions
3.25 The Commission consultations devoted much attention 
to how Australia might work more closely with the ASEAN 
organization and ASEAN countries in developing regional 
institutions (including the East Asia Summit). ASEAN 
participants noted that China (at least since 1998) has 
operated astutely in supporting ASEAN,128 sometimes seeking 
a degree of compromise in return. In 2012 there has been 
much reporting on China–ASEAN tensions, but it needs to be 
recalled that China does not question ASEAN’s leadership of 
regional institutions and it has made a strong commitment to 
the ASEAN Plus Three process, engaging actively in its large 
number of initiatives. 
Australia, the Commission was told, ought to follow China 
in working closely with ASEAN in such wider regional 
processes as the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Regional 
Forum, ADMM Plus and APEC—engaging seriously, for 
instance, in preliminary deliberations with ASEAN (especially 
in formulating agendas). Australia should proceed in 
this way, and be seen to do so. Based on this highly 
visible collaboration—so ASEAN representatives told the 
Commission—Australia could expect substantial ASEAN 
support for its own policy preferences.
3.26 In the case of the EAS, Australia wants to gather more 
substance to this institution, leaving less activity in the hands 
of the ASEAN Plus Three (APT), where Australia is not a 
member. The relationship between the EAS and APT—and 
the challenge this presents—is discussed below (4.49–4.54). 
Some countries, including China, have shown greater support 
for the more narrowly ‘Asian’, APT grouping. Whether the 
inclusion of the United States and Russia in the EAS (in 2011) 
will eventually strengthen or weaken the competitiveness of 
the EAS is as yet unclear. One argument suggests that the 
United States’ presence will strengthen the resolve of China 
and others to resist the moving of important business from 
the APT to the EAS. 
A private from the Australian Army assists in Banda Aceh following the massive 2004  
Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami. (COURTESY OF AUSTRALIAN CIVIL-MILITARY CENTRE VIA FLICKR)
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With respect to Australia, an ASEAN representative with 
significant experience in regional architecture told the 
Commission: “Australia can play a special role in the EAS—
China is certainly setting the pace elsewhere.” He pointed out 
that there is no other forum for Australia, but “here Australians 
can raise any issue they like. Use the EAS strategically.”
3.27 One initiative Australia has taken to add substance to 
the EAS is to join Indonesia in a disaster relief initiative—an 
Australia-Indonesia Disaster Reduction Facility in Jakarta, 
launched in July 2010, with a contribution from Australia of 
$67 million over five years. This is the type of collaborative 
substance building that Australia is well equipped to intro-
duce. Another area for action is the building of regional 
economic integration. The Economic Research Institute for 
ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA), established at the 3rd East Asia 
Summit (2007) and already involving Australia, was described 
by one senior ASEAN representative as an excellent “oppor-
tunity for strategic consolidation of Australia’s relations 
with ASEAN and other Asian countries.” ERIA is a research 
institute that can be “utilised to tie up the wider dimensions 
of deliberating trade liberalisation and cross-sectoral policy 
innovations, including how to tap into resources from the 
private sector to strengthen Track Two economic work.” 
—
Sub-regional initiatives 
3.28  Subregional arrangements in the ASEAN region may 
offer opportunities to Australia. ‘Growth areas’ are where a 
number of countries agree to work together to accelerate 
development in an area where each has sovereign territory, 
and which is geographically distant from their respective 
national capitals. The BIMP-EAGA—launched in 1994 and 
involving Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia and the 
Philippines—is geographically close to Australia, and the 
Commission was told it would welcome Australian assistance, 
including in the cultural and social sphere. The Australian 
Prime Minister could call into the meeting of the leaders 
of the BIMP-EAGA nations, which is held on the sidelines 
of the annual ASEAN Summit. One senior ASEAN official 
stressed that such a contribution to “ASEAN integration and 
community building” would “yield lasting results for ASEAN–
Australia relations.” 
—
Deepening geostrategic cooperation
3.29 The point was driven home in Commission deliberations 
that working together Australia and ASEAN countries could 
exercise more influence in Washington and Beijing (and 
perhaps Tokyo, New Delhi and Brussels). To a striking 
extent Australia’s international connections complement and 
enhance the already substantial diplomatic assets of ASEAN 
countries. Other collaborators might be enlisted in certain 
circumstances—South Korea’s potential contribution was 
stressed here—but already an ASEAN–Australia combination 
would attract considerable international legitimacy. Such 
collaboration would almost certainly be to the benefit of the 
EAS and other regional organisations, but it would also bring 
advantages at a broader global level. It could reinforce, for 
instance, the influence of Australia and Indonesia at G20 
meetings (where both these countries are members).
3.30 In the broadest sense (so the Commission was 
told) Australian assistance will help ASEAN in the task of 
‘enmeshing’ China and the United States in the Asia region, 
identifying every practical opportunity—in areas from trade 
and education and disaster relief to promoting people-to-
people links to raise these countries’ interest in the continued 
stability of Southeast Asia.129 The Commission heard the 
aspiration that these major external powers will start seeing 
themselves as part of a common regional venture, rather than 
as competitors or potential adversaries.  
—
Conclusion
3.31 Australia’s bilateral and multilateral relations across 
the Southeast Asia region are already broad and complex 
in scope, but there are further opportunities in such areas 
as energy, food security, infrastructure development and 
education. In general, current Australian business investment 
in ASEAN is strikingly weak—certainly compared with trade 
figures. The AANZFTA has considerable potential, but is 
so far much under-utilised. In the diplomatic realm the 
possibilities for Australia–ASEAN collaboration are great, 
both in existing regional institutions (such as the EAS) and 
more broadly. Working together we may have a greater 
chance of influencing for the better the evolving Washington–
Beijing dynamic. But what perhaps is of most immediate 
importance—so the Asialink consultations suggested—is the 
strong profiling of this Australia–Southeast Asia collaboration. 
It needs to be made highly visible in the context of regional 
institutions and geostrategic relations more generally, and 
also in the Australian domestic sphere.   
—
Australia can best influence the development of regional institutions such as the EAS,  
not by discussing ideal types of architecture but by proposing mechanisms that can 
translate discussions into action. Australia should work on these mechanisms with strategic 
ASEAN partners such as Thailand, Singapore, the Philippines and Malaysia.
ASEAN participant at the Asialink Commission
26  THE ASIALINK COMMISSION OUR PLACE IN THE ASIAN CENTURY
AUSTRALIAN ISSUES 
—
Australia’s Asia skills
4.1 Given Australia’s geographic proximity to the region, 
our ‘Asia’ skillset is lacking, in both the government and the 
private sectors. This observation is confirmed and addressed 
in the 2012 Asian Century White Paper.
4.2 In government, we have a respected depth of ASEAN 
knowledge and experience in our Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Austrade and the Department 
of Defence—though DFAT, according to a recent study,130 
is strikingly under-funded by world standards. Although 
Australia has representation in all ASEAN countries, it is 
only within the last two years that DFAT has invested heavily 
in Asian language-learning after finding (in 2008) that the 
department’s language skills ‘had been in decline for two 
decades.’131 A lack of ‘Asia’ skills in government is not 
surprising given that language teaching in Australian schools 
has been dwindling not growing. For example, currently 
available statistics show the number of schools teaching 
Chinese fell from 569 in 2000 to just over 380 in 2008; those 
teaching Japanese fell from 2,276 in 2000 to 1,921 in 2008; 
and schools teaching Korean virtually remained the same, a 
paltry 42 in 2000 and 46 in 2008.132 In Victoria alone, learning 
Indonesian plummeted from 82,000 primary students learning 
the language in 406 schools in 1999, to 39,049 primary 
students in 195 schools in 2010.133 This is reflected in the 
national statistics, which show that the learning of Indonesian 
fell a dramatic 40 percent from 2000 to 2008 and, if that trend 
continues, Indonesian will disappear entirely at Year 12 level 
within five years.134 Learning Indonesian at university level has 
also fallen dramatically—by 37 percent between 2001 and 
2010.135 
4.3 With respect to the failure of the Australian school 
system to provide an effective foundation for our ASEAN or 
wider Asia engagement, it needs to be pointed out also that 
there has been little opportunity for Australian students to 
take non-language courses dealing with the Asian region.136 
This is currently being addressed by the implementation of 
a new National School Curriculum—in the final stages of 
consultation and implementation. While there has been a 
declared intent to increase Asia content in the curriculum, it is 
yet to be seen how much of this content will be compulsory—
and where it is not, whether students will choose the Asia 
options.
4.4 Although Australian universities have a strong 
international reputation for research on ASEAN countries, 
the number of students taking Asia-related courses is low. 
Asian language enrolments in Australian universities appear 
on the surface to be increasing, but this is largely due to 
increases in the numbers of native speakers studying their 
own languages. At La Trobe University a 65 percent increase 
in Chinese language enrolments since 2001 was reported, 
but 62 percent of students are native Chinese speakers.137 
Less widely taught ASEAN languages, such as Vietnamese—
found only at the Australian National University and Victoria 
University (Melbourne)—are similarly dominated by native 
speakers. For example, Vietnamese enrolments at Victoria 
University have quadrupled since 2001, but this is largely due 
to a sizeable Vietnamese population in the university’s vicinity. 
Thai is taught at only one university. Most worrying was the 
2010 finding about the decline of Indonesian, with university 
enrolments declining every year since the mid-2000s.138
4.5 Business also faces a skills challenge. In 2011 Asialink 
and the Australian Industry Group conducted a survey of 
nearly 400 businesses—74 percent of these businesses 
reporting interest in engaging or further engaging with Asia, 
with China as the clear priority. Less than half of businesses 
with dealings in Asia, however, reported having any Board 
members or senior executives with Asia experience or 
language ability. Survey results also revealed a positive 
correlation between senior in-house Asia experience and 
business performance in Asia.139 
—
The investment ‘blind spot’
4.6 The relatively low level of Australian investment in 
ASEAN countries—highlighted already in this report (and 
note the recent indication of improvement)140—suggests there 
is a basis for concern about the degree of ‘Asia literacy’ in 
business. The issue must be whether the investment level is a 
consequence of Australian commercial prudence, or of a lack 
of Asia skills? The Commission noted the comparison of ANZ 
Bank investment strategies over recent years, pointing to the 
fact that a former CEO had the opportunity to buy the Thai 
Military Bank six years ago for some $190 million, but bought 
the Bank of New Zealand for $5 billion instead.  
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A lack of ‘Asia’ skills’ in government is not surprising given that language teaching in 
Australian schools has been dwindling not growing. (COURTESY OF ASIA EDUCATION FOUNDATION)
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Today the Thai bank is ‘worth multiples of the purchase 
price’ and the New Zealand bank ‘is going nowhere soon.’141 
Under new leadership the ANZ Bank is now engaging in a 
comprehensive and pioneering regional strategy that is widely 
considered to set new directions for Australian business. 
Among other companies that are increasingly focusing on the 
region, the Insurance Australia Group decided to enter the 
Asian market in 2003 and has since established wholly-owned 
and joint-venture operations in Malaysia and Thailand (as well 
as India and China), with well-developed plans for Vietnam 
and Indonesia. This expansion has been overseen by a senior 
member of the Executive Committee with Asia skills and 
experience.
4.7 Despite Australia’s proximity to Southeast Asia, the 
Commission did not encounter a strong view in ASEAN 
that Australian business people at this stage ‘understand 
the ASEAN region’ better than their European or American 
counterparts. A well-placed Australian businessman noted 
that a “major problem for Australia investing in Southeast Asia 
is ignorance of opportunity.” There is “a misunderstanding 
of the risk and a lack of confidence in our ability to manage 
risk.” The US, another Australian participant argued, “is just 
as risky an investment market—Australian investors can get 
brutalised there.” But Australians, he said, have a different 
perception of risk in America. Americans are seen to be ‘people 
like us’. Australian business expertise with respect to ASEAN 
countries is already assisted in various ways by the Australian 
Government (including through Austrade) and by such private-
sector initiatives as the PwC 2012 publication, South East Asia, 
Investment Opportunities, Tax and Other Incentives (a detailed 
analysis of the tax and other incentives offered to investors in 
all of the ASEAN countries). The Asian Century White Paper 
notes that Australia’s under-performing trade and investment 
in Southeast Asia might be due to a ‘misalignment between 
business perceptions’.142
4.8 Australians certainly see investment challenges in 
the ASEAN region, including a perception of a high level of 
corruption (in some countries more than others), and concerns 
about legal issues, market regulations, and a difficult or 
confusing range of regulatory differences in the insurance 
area. Corruption troubles many Australians: in the view of 
one Australian addressing the Commission, corruption is “the 
unutterable barrier to investment, no one wants to talk about it 
or identify it directly.” China is seen to have some advantage 
over ASEAN for investment purposes, because it is not 
burdened by the inter-state complexity of rules and practices 
that characterise ASEAN when it is approached as a single 
market.
4.9 Another investment impediment for Australians, the 
Commission was told, was that it can be “very difficult to get 
your money out.” Superannuation funds are a strong, potential 
source for Australian investment in ASEAN, but an expert 
Australian commented that fund managers are “looking for 
safety in investments” and currently “would not invest more 
than, say, 5 percent of a portfolio in Southeast Asia.”
4.10 Profitability is a further concern. Australian fund 
managers do not like Australian banks investing offshore, it 
was said, as they believe this brings a lower return on capital. 
The memory of the Asian Financial Crisis (1997–98) has also 
damaged Australian confidence in the ASEAN region. As 
discussed below, there are solid grounds for some of these 
Australian anxieties about the business context in the ASEAN 
region.
4.11 The nature of the Australian economy was identified 
as a factor in the low investment into ASEAN. We are 
primarily a services and resources exporter, with only a 
small manufacturing base. Southeast Asian countries tend 
to be protective of their services sectors and although 
manufacturing is strong in the region—and offers potential 
for investment—Australia’s manufacturing sector is not well 
equipped to back up an investment strategy in manufacturing. 
The Asian Century White Paper has expressed a determination 
to promote Australian participation in Asia’s manufacturing 
value chains.143 An area where we do have expertise, and 
a competitive advantage, is in logistics—and here we see 
Linfox, for instance, operating in twelve countries through the 
Asia–Pacific, including in Thailand.144 
—
Ten Malaysian Ringgit. The Commission was told that superannuation funds are a 
strong potential source for Australian investment in ASEAN. 
(COURTESY OF CHEE MENG AU YONG VIA FLICKR)
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Australian domestic politics
4.12 Australian domestic politics can be detrimental to our 
foreign relations, including in Southeast Asia. One recent 
episode (2011–12) was the denigration of Malaysia by those 
critical of the Australian government’s initiative to manage 
illegal refugee flows through a swapping arrangement with 
Malaysia. In August 2012, Malaysia’s High Commissioner to 
Australia was reported in Malaysia’s Straits Times objecting to 
Australian parliamentarians ‘bringing down and tarnishing the 
good name of another country’ in their domestic debate.145 
A regional solution will have to involve ‘many countries in 
the neighbourhood’—however, most countries in the region 
(including Malaysia) are not signatories to the United Nations 
Refugee Convention.146 Whatever the rights or wrongs of 
the proposed arrangement with Malaysia, close regional 
cooperation is obviously essential in handling international 
people movement, and the manner in which some politicians 
and sections of the Australian media portrayed Malaysia’s 
handling of refugees therefore has the potential to undermine 
future refugee management.
4.13 Australian domestic concerns similarly disrupted 
relations with Indonesia in 2011 when Australia suspended 
live cattle exports due to the treatment of animals in 
Indonesian abattoirs (see 3.7; 3.11). The Australian 
government faced strong pressure from sections of the 
Australian community, particularly advocates of animal rights, 
but was also criticised for the damaging way the matter was 
handled with our closest neighbour.147 Similar domestic 
outcries about an inhumane Indonesia have occurred when 
Australians have been imprisoned there for drug-related 
crimes—although Australian legal specialists have expressed 
the view that ‘there is a growing trend towards human 
rights’ in Indonesia.148 While Australians cannot be asked 
to put aside core community values, the manner in which 
disagreement is handled is vital. 
4.14 Community perceptions at a more general level have 
the potential to be damaging. Polling –by the Lowy Institute, 
Roy Morgan and others—suggests that a large number of 
Australians see Indonesia, in particular, as a country likely to 
cause difficulty for Australia, and the fear of Islamic terrorism 
is a factor. Indonesians tend to be somewhat more positive 
about Australia: Lowy’s 2012 Poll found that Indonesians 
felt more warmly towards Australia in 2011 than they did 
in 2006—however only 13 percent ‘strongly agreed’ that 
Australia is an important country in the region.149 Polling 
also points to contrasts in perspectives and values between 
Australians and Indonesians. For Australians climate change 
has begun to be seen as a major security issue; in Indonesia 
what is feared most is the break-up of their nation.150
4.15 More generally, community thinking about ‘Australia 
and the world’ tends to be limited in Australia to support for 
the United States alliance. In 2011, 82 percent of Australians 
saw the alliance as ‘very or fairly important for Australia’s 
security’ and 77 percent of Australians believed Australia 
would not be able to defend itself without the assistance of 
the United States. Looking around the world, when polled in 
2012, Australians felt most warmly about New Zealand (85º) 
and the United States (71º), followed by Japan (70º). While 
warm feelings towards Japan have increased steadily since 
2006 (when Lowy first measured Australia’s feelings towards 
other countries), Australia’s feelings towards Indonesia have 
only ever peaked at 54º, China’s and South Korea’s at 61º, 
and India’s at 62º.151
4.16 Negative or ill-informed public-perception trends are a 
matter of concern as they suggest a community orientation 
that will lag behind a government attempt to profile a creative 
partnership with ASEAN countries, and they point to the need 
for careful political leadership. It is well known that political 
capital can be gained from exploiting rather than calming 
popular anxieties—but in respect to the ASEAN region, it is 
difficult to think of anything that would be more damaging to 
Australia’s future prosperity and security. 
4.17 Media representation of Southeast Asia is an area 
of serious concern. The Commission heard numerous 
complaints from regional participants about both negative 
portrayals and the relative neglect of Southeast Asia in 
Australia’s media. There is frustration that too often ‘Asia’ is 
construed as China and India—a criticism levelled not only at 
Australia, but more broadly. There are a number of specialist 
journalists in Australia whose writing on ASEAN issues has 
been exemplary, but the Commission discussions suggested 
that in general there is a need for journalists to be better 
briefed. It showed some lack of understanding of Australian 
media traditions, it must be said, when the observation was 
made by one ASEAN representative that “China is good at 
using ASEAN news to present itself as a constructive player—
Australia could also do this.”
4.18 Information communication technologies (ICTs) 
have changed the way news is delivered and consumed 
across Australia and the Asia region. There are now greater 
opportunities—including social media platforms and 
streamed video—for the large-scale promotion of messages 
that bypass traditional media outlets. 
—
PART 4 CHALLENGES TO STRONGER ENGAGEMENT CONTINUED
The Australian media’s understanding of ASEAN is in general very poor  
and negative. It undermines Australia’s role.
Southeast Asian journalist at the Asialink Commission—
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Australia and the US alliance
4.19 Although Australia’s United States alliance can assist 
our relations in the Asian region, the ‘deputy sheriff’ label 
is damaging. Australian participants in the Commission 
tended to believe the label is unwarranted in that it suggests 
Australian governments do not make independent policy 
judgements to advance specifically Australian national 
interests.152 But the ‘deputy sheriff’ tag is potent in ASEAN. 
One contributor from Indonesia commented that it tends 
‘to represent the whole image of Australia, especially in its 
relations with ASEAN.’ Also, the Commission frequently 
encountered the observation that the tag undermines us 
because it suggests that Australia fails to differentiate itself 
sufficiently from the United States in terms of regional 
policy. The image of ‘deputy sheriff’ was reinforced again 
in November 2011—according to a range of reports from 
ASEAN to the Asialink Commission—with the announcement 
with some fanfare of an upgrading of United States–Australian 
defence relations.153 
4.20 Apart from Chinese criticism of Australia’s strengthened 
military arrangements with the United States, the Indonesian 
foreign minister (as reported in the Asian media) expressed 
anxiety about ‘reaction and counter reaction’ and ‘a vicious 
circle of tension and mistrust or distrust.’154 A Bangkok 
Post editorial noted that the announcement ‘cements 
long-standing bonds between Americans and Australians.’ 
The two countries, the editorial continued, are ‘placed at 
the far corners of the Pacific’ and have ‘sometimes been 
fervently involved in Asia, but usually in wars.’155 The 
Japanese government declared that it welcomed the US-
Australia move156 but one Japanese newspaper featured a 
cartoon portraying Prime Minister Gillard as a small dog, 
dragged along by the collar by US Secretary Clinton. A 
lead commentary in the British Financial Times made the 
disturbing observation that: ‘Historians will look back and 
ask whether November 2011 marked the moment when 
tensions with China, the superpower-in-waiting, escalated 
irreversibly.’157
4.21 As the ‘deputy sheriff’ discussion indicates, the 
Commission heard that the manner in which Australia 
manages its United States alliance matters greatly in our 
regional relations. An Australia building a special role for itself 
in the Asia region, bringing as one of our assets a strong 
United States relationship—deploying that asset on behalf 
of the region as well as Australia—is attractive to many in 
ASEAN. An Australia that is perceived as having submerged 
its individuality in United States global power has to be less 
influential in regional terms and thus, it must be stressed, 
a less useful ally to the United States. One obvious way to 
mitigate the ‘deputy sheriff’ image would be through greater 
and well publicised ASEAN-region collaboration. 
—
Australia’s interactions with regional 
institutions
4.22 Australia has displayed a talent for domestic as well 
as international institution building, and this is known and 
respected in some quarters in Asia. Australian interest in 
regional institutions, however, can be damaging as well 
as attractive. The Commission recognised Australia’s long 
record of promoting regional institutions (both government-to-
government and Track Two), but also noted difficulties such as 
the failed Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC) of the 1960s and, 
more recently, the Asia Pacific Community.
4.23 Australia has also attracted criticism for a tendency 
to advocate ‘Asia Pacific’ regionalism in competition with 
‘East Asian’ institution building. ‘Asia Pacific’ initiatives, it is 
sometimes said, are more about locking the United States into 
the region than contributing to the evolution of a new ‘Asia’. 
Australia has received positive comment on its diplomacy, for 
instance, in the early 1990s when its foreign minister eventually 
began to work with key regional groups in the building of the 
ARF.158 The relaxed Australian response to the creation in 1997 
of the ASEAN Plus Three (which excluded both Australia and 
the United States) also won respect, as did its decision in 
2005 to join the EAS—at the time an ASEAN-led organisation 
which did not include the United States. The Australian 2008 
proposal for an ‘Asia Pacific Community’ (APC), on the other 
hand, was resented in influential quarters in ASEAN—partly 
because it was seen to challenge ASEAN leadership. The 
fact that the Australian Government then listened to regional 
advice—dropping the APC and beginning to focus support on 
ASEAN regional initiatives—was again well received. 
4.24 The Commission heard the view that Australia gains 
most regional influence when cooperating with Asian states, 
usually Japan or ASEAN countries. An oft-cited example is 
the initiating in 2002 of the Bali Process—aimed at combating 
people smuggling, trafficking in persons and related crimes in 
the Asia–Pacific region—chaired by Australia and Indonesia. 
4.25 The point was reiterated time and again during 
Commission discussions that Australia should not attempt to 
work around ASEAN. Even if ASEAN moves slowly, the best 
way to achieve more substance, in the EAS for instance, is to 
work with the ASEAN countries in the first instance. Australia 
gains influence by being seen to support ASEAN ‘in the 
driving seat’, not by trying to remove it. Attempts to bypass 
ASEAN—and the Asia Pacific Community proposal was seen 
as doing just that—provoke opposition in Southeast Asia and 
may cause suspicion in Northeast Asia. They are likely to 
frustrate rather than promote Australia’s regional ambitions. 
—
\Australia has to change its narrative, and demonstrate  
willingness to consult with ASEAN.
Southeast Asian journalist at the Asialink Commission—
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Australian views of free trade agreements
4.26 The debate around free trade agreements suggests 
a difference between Australian and ASEAN positions. In 
general FTAs appear to be viewed less warmly in Australia 
than in ASEAN. A study of the effectiveness of FTAs 
undertaken by the Australian Industry Group in 2009 found 
that around two-thirds of Australian exporters believed 
‘FTAs had little or no effectiveness in assisting their export 
activities.’159 When rating the effectiveness of FTAs to their 
export activities 75 percent of businesses reported ‘low or not 
effective’ for the Australia–Thailand FTA, and 82 percent for 
Australia–Singapore FTA.160 The report concluded that there 
is a ‘serious disconnect’ between the level of government 
investment into FTAs and the benefits they deliver to 
business.161
4.27 Some of the criticism of FTAs in Australia is quite 
generalised. Economist Ross Garnaut was recently quoted 
in The Australian as saying that preferential trade agreements 
‘on balance and in general, damage overall trade.’162 An 
Australian Productivity Commission Research Report, Bilateral 
and Regional Trade Agreements, published in November 2010 
did not find that FTAs damage overall trade, but among its 
key findings the report noted that there was ‘little evidence’ 
to indicate that they provide any substantial commercial 
benefits, and that processes for assessing their value tended 
‘to oversell the likely benefits.’163
4.28 Some Australian business people say that FTAs do not 
focus sufficiently on sectors outside the traditional and more 
established area of goods—and trade in goods is considered 
to be a much simpler area to negotiate than services and 
investment. Also, as one Australian businessman put it to the 
Commission: “FTAs are not as useful to Australia because 
resources, our major export, do not form a part of a value-
added supply chain. New Zealand, on the other hand, has 
had great success with FTAs because of its dairy exports, 
which are transformed into other products.”
4.29 Australia, the Commission was told, needs to develop 
FTAs that concentrate on services and investment sectors as 
areas of enormous growth potential. This may not be easy. 
As discussed, there is resistance in some ASEAN countries to 
opening up to offshore competition in the services sector, and 
some Australian business people are in any case sceptical 
about FTA opportunities. For example, the Commission 
was told that a company like Linfox would not utilise an FTA 
because it already has a competitive advantage in transport 
logistics, while an insurance expert in the region noted that: 
“Not one FTA has improved insurance relationships between 
Australia and Asia.”
4.30 In consultations with ASEAN representatives, the 
Commission encountered a greater degree of support for 
FTAs. The view is more often encountered there that FTAs 
provide a mechanism for state-to-state contact on a regular 
basis and this at least helps to build relationships. FTAs 
are also seen to be helpful to the process of implementing 
domestic reform: in the ASEAN context where regulatory 
development is uneven, and where corruption can undermine 
business confidence, FTAs can be used to implement reforms 
aimed at regional uniformity that would otherwise be difficult 
to push through domestically. That is, the implementation 
of reforms can be rationalised as part of a state’s FTA 
responsibilities. 
4.31 Within the ambit of FTAs—so ASEAN participants told 
the Commission—there is also scope for capacity building, 
especially in the services sector where foreign lawyers, 
accountants, bankers and insurance brokers engage with 
their Southeast Asia counterparts, facilitating the transference 
of knowledge and expertise in the less institutionally-
developed ASEAN nations. It has been argued that ASEAN’s 
interest in drawing Australia into closer relations after 2004, 
and in entering into FTAs, was influenced by the assumption 
that Australia and New Zealand ‘would help boost ASEAN’s 
access to markets and relevant technical skills.’164 
—
Multilateralism vs bilateralism
4.32 Whether priority should be given to bilateral or 
multilateral relations is an issue for Australians. Australia 
is often seen as bilateralist—taking a country-by-country 
approach—and that can be a problem. The Inquiry into 
Australia’s Relationship with ASEAN stated that several 
government bodies—Foreign Affairs and Trade, Immigration 
and Citizenship, and the Australian Federal Police—approach 
regional relations on a mostly bilateral basis: that is, issues 
that are raised with the ASEAN Secretariat are also raised 
with each of the ASEAN member states on a bilateral basis.165 
The new Asian Century White Paper also puts a stress on 
‘country strategies’.166 Just how bilateralist Australia is in 
practice, however, is unclear. The last Coalition Government 
insisted on giving priority to bilateralism but was an active 
supporter of APEC and led Australia into the new East Asia 
Summit in 2005; the current Labor Government has certainly 
concentrated on strengthening our role in the EAS. 
4.33 The issue of bilateralism/multilateralism arises 
particularly in the case of FTAs. Although Australia’s largest 
multilateral agreement is the regional AANZFTA, its size—so 
the Commission was told—condemns it as a slow moving 
and overly complex arrangement. Some Australian trade 
officials see bilateral agreements as more agile in their 
ability to make adjustments relatively quickly to keep driving 
momentum. 
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4.34 With respect to the approach adopted by the business 
sector, the Commission heard a range of views. Some argued 
that the sector took an increasingly ‘pan-Asian’ attitude; 
others said they favour bilateralism. The facts are best 
examined sector by sector. For example, in the case of the 
insurance industry, the Commission was told that ASEAN’s 
economic integration “is a waste of time—we take a bilateral 
approach because the markets are so different due to the 
nature of the industry.” A senior Australian from the financial 
services sector commented that his business also “prefers 
bilateral relationships,” adding that he and others saw “limited 
use” in FTAs. Other sectors, however, are turning to the 
multilateral approach: education, for instance, is developing 
networks of Australian campuses, tertiary education 
partnerships, vocational course delivery and accredited 
university courses across the Asia region.
4.35 Whatever the truth of the matter, the perception that 
Australia is essentially bilateralist causes a degree of damage 
in ASEAN. “As a bilateralist”, a Southeast Asian Commission 
participant asked, “does Australia want to deal with ASEAN 
as a whole or not?” Bilateralism is the traditional strategy of 
major powers, and in Southeast Asia it is remembered as 
the ‘hub and spokes’ attitude long adopted by the United 
States in the region. When Australia opts for bilateralism this 
tends to feed into the ‘deputy sheriff’ trope. Australia, ASEAN 
representatives advised, needs to differentiate itself from this 
type of ‘divide and conquer’ approach—to distance itself from 
the perceived arrogant Western behaviour of the past.
4.36 Australians are encouraged to recognise that ASEAN 
countries favour multilateralism: as one senior Singaporean 
told the Commission, “overlapping groups are seen as 
a virtue in Asia; we incline to strategic promiscuity.” This 
proliferation of overlapping groups is a reflection of the 
‘enmeshment’ strategies outlined earlier with respect to 
China—strategies whereby a multiplicity of arrangements 
are entered into, compelling cooperation and commitment 
between the larger and smaller states in the region. In 
urging Australia to adhere to such a multilateral approach 
for strategic reasons, Southeast Asian participants told the 
Commission that Australia might actually learn something 
from ASEAN. Here one can detect a desire to ‘socialize’ not 
only China but also Australia. 
—
Refining the Australian narrative
4.37 Australia has an advantage in not being seen to adopt 
a lecturing style in Southeast Asia, at least when compared 
with the United States. We are most effective when we work 
collaboratively, and this observation should be highlighted. 
Australian aid is valued—for instance, in the case of the less 
developed ASEAN states of Cambodia and Laos—and should 
be given greater publicity. But careful attention needs to be 
paid to how the Australian role is portrayed. 
4.38 Australia is bound to have interests and perspectives 
that diverge from time to time from those of ASEAN countries, 
but some differences may be best set aside. To defend 
Australian ‘national interest’ is one matter—every government 
in the region makes that claim—but Australian initiatives to 
assist and advise other countries, or bring reform to them, 
have to be handled with utmost diplomacy. Even Australia’s 
initiatives with respect to regional architecture have been met 
with the hostile comment: ‘who do you think you are, coming 
to the region and trying to impose new institutions on us?’
4.39 To take some examples of useful collaboration 
with ASEAN countries, working with Indonesia was vital 
in Australia’s initiative to achieve a peace settlement in 
Cambodia in the early 1990s.167 In 2002 Australia collaborated 
with Indonesia again to institute the ‘Bali Process’, which 
brings governments together to combat people smuggling 
and other transnational crimes in the Asia Pacific. Australia 
today is joining with Indonesia in the East Asia Summit to 
create stronger regional cooperation toward ‘disaster rapid 
response’. In such Track Two ventures as the Council for 
Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific and the Asialink 
Conversations, Australia consistently works with ASEAN 
partners.168 This report, as explained already, is a product of 
Australia–ASEAN collaboration—and the ASEAN contributors 
stressed time and again that such interaction is the ideal in 
Australia–ASEAN relations. The Asian Century White Paper 
supports “strong Australian participation” in Track Two.169 
—
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ASEAN ISSUES 
—
Business disincentives
4.40 There are genuine disincentives for Australian business 
in ASEAN, as the World Bank’s ‘Doing Business’ rankings 
and ‘Corruption Perceptions Index’ outlined earlier suggest 
(see 2.4). The Asialink Commission confirmed that a major 
obstacle in all but Singapore and Malaysia is getting credit 
and protecting investors—significant concerns for business. 
We also heard frequent references to a lack of openness 
in some sectors due to nationalist concerns and protective 
attitudes towards sovereignty. This is particularly the case 
in the financial services sector where problems tend to 
overshadow investment potential. Australia has much to 
offer in the services area—with our experienced lawyers, 
accountants, actuaries and strong institutional framework—
but ASEAN countries need to open their economies to 
encourage our greater involvement. One difficulty is that 
these countries tend not to encourage large foreign banks, 
especially US banks, often seeing them as being tainted by 
the GFC. Australia is so closely associated with the US, one 
Australian businessman suggested, that our banks—despite 
being among the most secure in the world—are also seen 
to be tainted. In some service industries—insurance is one 
of them—Australian firms are simply perceived in ASEAN as 
competitors, and for this reason have trouble gaining access.
4.41 A ‘structural obstacle’ in the insurance, investment 
and other service industries concerns their social interface—
the fact that people depend upon insurance and banking 
in a very personal way, and see them as central pillars 
of their domestic economies. These industries—and 
airlines and telecommunications as well—have a direct 
crossover between business and the wider community, 
and are often heavily and centrally regulated in the name of 
‘national interest’ and ‘national identity’. As one Australian 
businessman explained to the Commission, “service sectors 
include highly-connected groups—some heads of finance 
institutions with strong political connections.” In all these 
ways Australian investors can face resistance which needs to 
be tackled by governments, possibly in an FTA process. 
—
ASEAN integration?
4.42 ASEAN has not yet become an integrated regional 
body, although it has developed further than other regional 
institutions around the world, with the exception of the 
European Union. ASEAN’s achievements have been noted 
in Part 2 of this report, but the weaknesses of the regional 
institution also need to be confronted in an initiative to 
strengthen Australia engagement with Southeast Asia. In 
particular, ASEAN has a long distance to go before it can be 
considered a single market for investment and trade. It is also 
the case that a good deal of distrust continues to influence 
security relations within the region.
4.43 Although the ASEAN organisation in 2003 adopted an 
ambitious agenda, committing to create an ASEAN Economic 
Community (AEC), an ASEAN Political-Security Community 
and an ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community, the Commission 
encountered much concern about the progress achieved. 
An official ASEAN Scorecard registers progress toward the 
Economic Community at 73.6 percent achieved as at 2010,170 
but there is considerable scepticism (including among 
Asialink Commission participants) about the 2015 deadline.171 
“The AEC won’t be in place by 2015”, one regional economist 
said candidly. There is no political will for integration, 
he added—no relocation of production, no currency 
coordination, and no ASEAN banking framework. Anecdotal 
evidence also suggests there is surprisingly little awareness 
of the AEC in the business community. The Commission 
heard that the AEC idea is undermined by lingering questions 
about the rationale behind ASEAN’s economic integration, 
and by confusion about what type of community the AEC 
should actually be. Will it encompass the services sector and 
how much integration needs to be achieved to encourage 
external investment? Such a lack of clarity will not only be 
a major challenge for ASEAN—a group of ten nation-states 
with vastly different regulatory systems, political systems 
and national interests—but also for external partners such 
as Australia which look for economic harmonisation to boost 
confidence in regional investment. 
4.44 With respect to the ASEAN Political-Security Community 
and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community objectives, 
there is again need for balanced assessment. It is true that 
the ASEAN region has been remarkably free of inter-state 
violence—remarkable in particular because of the complex 
border situations that are largely a consequence of the period 
of European colonial rule in the region—but suspicion still 
operates between many of the component states. ASEAN 
member countries tend to have closer security relations 
with states outside the region than with one another, and 
there are even signs of rivalry in the pattern of weapons 
modernisation.172 
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Indonesia is becoming a special case in ASEAN from 
numerous perspectives. Given its comparative size—its 
population is roughly the size of the Philippines, Vietnam and 
Thailand combined—and its growing economy, Indonesia 
is showing signs of thinking beyond ASEAN. As a member 
of the G20, for instance, it plays a role on a world not just a 
regional stage—and some key Indonesians are beginning to 
ask how far a preoccupation with ASEAN benefits Indonesian 
objectives.173
4.45 Some commentators have warned that one 
consequence of the economic and military rise of China may 
be to promote a rift within ASEAN, in which most Mainland 
Southeast Asian countries (Vietnam would almost certainly be 
an exception) gravitate toward China while ASEAN’s Island 
region seeks to maintain greater strategic flexibility.174 There 
is certainly variation in the way different ASEAN states are 
responding to China,175 and a divergence of aspiration is also 
evident in the range of approaches to regional development 
on the part of ASEAN countries. Today Indonesia continues 
to support a wider, more inclusive view of regional 
development—emphasising the need to foster the East 
Asia Summit (now including the United States and Russia 
as well as India, Australia and New Zealand). Many of the 
Mainland states, and Malaysia, seem to be relaxed with the 
more narrow ASEAN Plus Three process favoured by China. 
As stated above (in Part 3), one opportunity Australia could 
pursue in helping ASEAN moderate this possible ASEAN rift 
is to inject investment into more horizontal infrastructure to 
promote connectivity.
4.46  The failure of the July 2012 ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ 
meeting to issue an official communique—the first time 
this has happened in ASEAN’s history—has been cited 
as a demonstration of the growing division in ASEAN. The 
Philippines had wanted to include a reference to its dispute 
with China with respect to the Scarborough Shoal in the 
South China Sea, but Cambodia—as chair of the meeting—
refused. Those critical of this development argued that 
China, which has consistently sought to avoid multilateral 
rather than bilateral negotiations regarding such disputes as 
those relating to the South China Sea, is Cambodia’s largest 
investor and is a substantial aid donor, and that Cambodia 
had consulted China. The Cambodia meeting’s failure can 
certainly be seen as a demonstration of the weakness of 
ASEAN, but faced with the determined intervention of a major 
power such a faltering of ASEAN unanimity is not surprising. 
It should also be noted that following the meeting Indonesia’s 
Foreign Minister carried out an impressive shuttle-diplomacy 
initiative. After a series of meetings with his counterparts, all 
ASEAN Foreign Ministers agreed to a ‘Six Principle’ plan for 
approaching South China Sea issues. Indonesia, though not 
currently the ASEAN chair, showed leadership here—and may 
continue to assist ASEAN’s effectiveness in this way.176 
4.47 The Commission also received anxious comment 
about the progress of the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. 
Although the 2003 official statement referred to cultivating 
‘regional identity’ and ‘people’s awareness of ASEAN’, people 
in ASEAN countries have not yet begun to use the terms 
‘ASEAN’ or ‘Southeast Asian’ in the way ‘European’ might be 
used in the EU region. It is true that bringing together all ten 
Southeast Asian states in 1999 gave the ASEAN leadership 
the opportunity to proclaim ‘One Southeast Asia’;177 and, 
since an ASEAN ‘People’s Assembly’ was first held in 2000, 
there have been various ASEAN initiatives in the arts, as 
well as a lively Track Two network (particularly the ASEAN 
ISIS network). Nevertheless, commentators continue to be 
wary about the prospect of a ‘supra-national, ASEAN-wide 
common identity.’178 Creating regional glue has been a 
formidable task in a region that lacks a common religious or 
legal heritage and must use English as a ‘common working 
language’ rather than ‘an emotive common language’ that 
might express some ‘regional cultural content.’179 
4.48 These cautionary considerations about the progress of 
ASEAN are important, but should not be exaggerated. They 
are a reminder that Australia must continue to give priority 
to bilateral as well as multilateral engagement in the ASEAN 
region. Nevertheless, ASEAN as an organisation has achieved 
a good deal, and the adoption of the ASEAN Charter 
and other initiatives of the last few years are promising 
developments. 
—
Downtown Phnom Penh. China is Cambodia’s largest investor and a substantial aid donor.
(COURTESY OF NEWPORT PREACHER VIA FLICKR)
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The East Asia Summit vs ASEAN Plus Three
4.49 ASEAN-led wider regional institutions also need to 
be viewed realistically. Australia is at present expressing 
much faith in the East Asia Summit—and to do so makes 
diplomatic sense. The Prime Minister has pointed to the EAS 
as an arena where she hopes to make a mark in foreign 
relations, noting the Summit is ‘becoming a much more 
important part of the way our region comes together.’180 At 
present, however, the EAS Leaders’ meeting is exceptionally 
brief—less than a single day—and there is no strict agenda. 
A Foreign Ministers’ meeting has been added to the Summit, 
but there is still no institutional machinery supporting the 
EAS process. The idea of establishing an EAS Secretariat 
has been rejected as potentially diminishing ASEAN’s role—
but consideration is being given to expanding the capacity 
of the ASEAN Secretariat to accommodate the growing 
importance of the EAS. Initially the Summit had five priority 
areas—finance, education, energy, disaster management 
and avian flu prevention—but this was refined in 2011. 
Connectivity was added as a priority, while avian flu was 
replaced with communicable diseases, and energy security 
was replaced with food and water security. Implementation 
of work programs for each of these areas is still at an early 
stage. The Asialink Commission, it should be stressed, heard 
some tough assessments of the EAS, including from ASEAN 
insiders—one declaring that “nothing concrete” would come 
from the EAS process; it is, he said, “an empty shell.” 
4.50 As noted in 3.26, one challenge the East Asia 
Summit faces is competition from the ASEAN Plus Three 
(APT) process—a process in which Australia is not a 
participant—and this competition is shaped by regional 
strategic dynamics. The complexity of regional institutional 
architecture, it should be kept in mind, reflects the 
complexity of competing and changing national interests 
and perspectives. Far from being inclusive in tone, the 1997 
creation of the APT was influenced by disappointment with 
the West at the time of the Asian Financial Crisis (1997–98). 
The APT is also backed strongly by China—as indicated at 
a China–ASEAN meeting in 2003, where it was agreed to 
‘make the ASEAN Plus Three mechanism the main channel to 
move forward cooperation and regional economic integration 
in East Asia and Asia as a whole ... ’181 ASEAN Plus Three 
currently has far more substance than the EAS, with sixty-five 
mechanisms (one summit, seventeen ministerial, twenty-three 
Senior Officials, one Directors-General, seventeen technical 
level meetings and six other track meetings) covering such 
areas as finance, transnational crime, tourism, health, labour, 
social welfare, energy, telecommunications, agriculture and 
the environment. 
As well as the annual Leaders’ Summit, there are annual 
meetings for Foreign Ministers, Environment Ministers, 
Ministers of Agriculture, Ministers for Telecommunication, 
Tourism Ministers and Labour Ministers. Beneath this strata 
are Senior Officials Meetings (SOM) and a wide range of other 
official meetings. ASEAN, the Commission heard, seems 
reluctant to replicate this sort of complexity in the EAS—and, 
in any case, some ASEAN leaders take the view that the EAS 
should continue to be a high-level summit, while the APT 
operates as a vehicle for functional cooperation.  
4.51 The Commission was warned that promoting the EAS 
would require much diplomatic skill. This is not just because 
of the energy already invested in the APT. There is a range of 
views, including within ASEAN, about the way the EAS and 
the APT should be related to one another. In a sense these 
two processes represent competing regionalisms. From an 
Australian perspective, it has been considered necessary to 
bring as much substance as possible into the EAS, expanding 
on the EAS’s five priority areas and resisting the claims of 
APT. In some ways the presence in the EAS of the United 
States—with all its vast resources and influence—may be an 
advantage, offering the opportunity to argue that this broader 
body has the right membership to handle most practical 
challenges. But this ignores the identity dimension of regional 
institutions, which may tend to favour a process that is more 
explicitly ‘East Asian’ over one that could be dismissed as 
being essentially ‘Asia Pacific’. 
4.52 One influential position—associated with the Chinese 
leadership and with former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir, 
but supported more quietly by many others in Malaysia 
and elsewhere—is that the APT is the real core group. It 
possesses a stronger cultural foundation than the EAS on 
which to build a ‘regional community’. APT, the Commission 
was told, “has a geographical identity, it is building a ‘vision 
group’. With the EAS you lose identity.” And again, from a 
senior ASEAN official: the EAS “is not a community” and 
it is “not where some Southeast Asians wish to place their 
energy”. The APT, by contrast, was described as “established 
and long term”. Singapore and Indonesia, it should be noted, 
have shown more sympathy toward the EAS—but one reason 
for this in the Indonesian case seems to be that the EAS is a 
looser grouping and is considered to be less likely to threaten 
Indonesian national sovereignty. Indonesia, having the largest 
market in ASEAN, also fears the greater quantities of Chinese 
imports that accompany the enhancing of China–ASEAN 
economic relations—a relationship that is promoted more 
specifically by the APT than the EAS arrangement. 
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4.53 For those states especially wary of China (which does 
not include Malaysia or Thailand) the EAS—with the United 
States, India, and Australia as members—is seen as having 
a capacity to counter the potentially dominant position 
of China in the region.182 In such a context, China can be 
expected to be even more committed to the APT rather than 
the EAS, attempting to keep major activities within the former 
process. Whether China will show even greater determination 
now that the United States is in the EAS is not yet clear. 
The Commission heard some negative views from ASEAN, 
including the perception “that the US will not be good for the 
EAS.” Given the presence of such anxiety about the entry of 
the United States, it could be argued that Australia should not 
trumpet the United States entry as an Australian achievement, 
but rather try to work quietly to assist American participation 
in the EAS process. In November 2011 it was difficult to 
adopt this strategy—with the United States President visiting 
Australia just before the meeting, and the Australia–United 
States announcement about an enhanced military relationship 
being presented as ‘the most important expansion of strategic 
ties since the joint facilities in the Cold War nuclear era.’183 
4.54 Faced with the competition between the EAS and 
APT, Australia ought to avoid putting all our eggs in the EAS 
basket. What can be done outside the EAS structure? The 
report has already referred to a range of organisations and 
processes, offering opportunities for engagement in both 
multilateral and bilateral contexts. There is the ADMM Plus, as 
well as APEC and the wide-membership security organisation, 
the ASEAN Regional Forum. There are also the Australia–
ASEAN meetings—the official ASEAN–Australia Forum 
(held every eighteen months to two years), the leaders-level 
ASEAN–Australia Summit (last held in Hanoi in 2010)—as well 
as the bilateral governmental Institutes with three individual 
ASEAN countries, and various Track Two meetings (as set 
out in 2.24 and 4.39). The Commission was told that one 
way for Australia to engage directly with ASEAN Plus Three 
is to contribute directly to the currency-swapping Chiang Mai 
Initiative—but this is something for the ASEAN Plus Three to 
decide, and the initiative also needs to overcome practical 
problems before becoming an effective mechanism. The 
recent Asia Century White Paper says ‘we remain interested in 
participating’ in this initiative.184 
—
Conclusion—Overcoming the challenges
4.55 With respect to ASEAN issues and its own 
organisational problems, Australia will need to be realistic 
about what can be achieved, and how quickly. With careful 
diplomacy—stressing a ‘collaborative’ rather than ‘donor’ 
style—Australia may be able to help the integration of ASEAN 
itself, as well as support any attempts ASEAN may make to 
strengthen wider regional processes such as the EAS, ADMM 
Plus and the ARF. In these wider processes it is especially 
important to be seen to be supportive. 
4.56 ASEAN may not succeed in its goal to establish ASEAN 
communities by 2015, but this will offer opportunities as well 
as disappointment. Working alone or in cooperation with 
other ASEAN neighbours (such as Japan, South Korea and 
India) Australia may be able to assist ASEAN integration. 
Success will not only make ASEAN a more attractive 
economy but also a more confident negotiator with China. It 
will also require patience, and sensitivity to the fact that there 
are today competing types of regionalism in the Asia region.
4.57 In considering regional institutions and free trade 
agreements, we need to listen to (and be seen to listen to) 
ASEAN voices—press our own views certainly, but remember 
that a compromise that ensures a united front with ASEAN 
countries will usually be the best option. 
4.58 In the case of the specifically Australian issues, the 
impediments to closer engagement with the ASEAN region 
need to be dealt with head-on. The matter of the Australian 
community’s knowledge of Southeast Asia and ASEAN 
requires immediate, comprehensive attention—and this will 
take political will and authority. The importance of Australia 
being skilled-up on Southeast Asia—given the proximity of 
the region and its obvious importance for Australia’s future—
ought to be obvious, but it seems not to be.
4.59 The idea of an ‘Australia–ASEAN region’ partnership 
needs to be projected in the Australian community—and 
doing this effectively will create a more conducive climate 
in which to handle Australia–Asia practical issues in such 
areas as investment, trade, immigration, refugee control, 
drug-trafficking, media representation and regional institution 
building. 
4.60 Our United States alliance, when managed carefully, 
can be a major asset in Australia’s ASEAN endeavours. The 
‘deputy sheriff’ label, however, is damaging.  
—
36  THE ASIALINK COMMISSION OUR PLACE IN THE ASIAN CENTURY
Although it may appear a modest response at first glance, 
a Southeast Asia strategy offers a ‘third way’ for Australia 
to make a contribution to regional stability. The Asialink 
Commission confirmed that the ASEAN relationship—the 
relationship with specific states in ASEAN as well as the 
ASEAN regional grouping—already has much substance in 
its security, economic and people-to-people dimensions. We 
have a firm basis for creating a deeper collaboration– and 
the Commission also found strong Southeast Asian support 
for such a development. The Australia–ASEAN connection, 
however, does not currently have a high profile internationally 
or within Australia—and it is the wider international 
significance of the connection which is the principal concern 
of this report.
Looking into the next decades, taking into account the extent 
to which many ASEAN countries are predicted to grow 
economically (including in comparison with Australia), the 
substance of Australia–ASEAN relations has the potential 
to expand dramatically. This report suggests ways in which 
to further that expansion, and examines the economic 
and other gains a stronger engagement will bring to both 
Australia and ASEAN countries. It has endeavoured to do this 
in consultation—to gauge what the region wants and what 
Australia is in a strong position to deliver. It also focusses on 
issues of style and presentation in Australia–Southeast Asian 
interaction. 
In arguing the case for Australia–ASEAN collaboration in 
the wider Asian region—for Southeast Asia to be positioned 
as central to an Australia ‘Asia strategy’—the report (itself a 
cooperative Australia–ASEAN initiative) suggests Australia 
would as a result be in a position to project a modified image. 
Such a growing intimacy with ASEAN countries would convey 
the sense of a less lonely—less defensive—country. Such an 
Australia—labelling itself in a sense as ‘US-ally Plus’—would 
be a bigger country, a country able to communicate a greater 
civilisational reach. Understood internationally in this way, 
Australia would also have more to bring to its relationships 
both with the United States and China.
Consolidating such an ASEAN orientation for Australia 
will be achieved firstly, by promoting even more practical 
cooperation, building on the many arrangements already in 
place. Enhanced defence and police cooperation; new levels 
of collaboration in combating transnational crime; a deeper 
investment role; the maximum utilisation of AANZFTA; a 
higher Australian profile in energy and food supply; and the 
development of connectivity infrastructure—all are initiatives 
that benefit both Australia and our ASEAN partners. 
The process of building such collaboration—acquiring 
deeper interpersonal understandings and accumulating 
habits of consultation and cooperation—will also strengthen 
the foundation for working more closely together in the 
wider region and international contexts. Perhaps most 
important, however, to implement such a national ASEAN 
strategy will require projecting the ideal of Australia–ASEAN 
engagement to the Australian domestic community, as well as 
internationally. 
As one ASEAN commentator put it to the Commission, we 
need to alter the Australian national narrative—highlight 
imaginatively Australia’s ASEAN dimension, show how it 
has become increasingly important over the years, how 
the Australia–Southeast Asian partnership operates in 
international forums, regional and global contexts. The aim 
would be to make the Southeast Asian priority part of the 
‘strategic bedrock of our foreign and security policy’—make 
it a taken-for-granted thing, just as the United States alliance 
has become the starting point for thinking about how Australia 
positions itself in the world. Critically, an embedded Australia–
ASEAN connection might be deployed to bring a degree 
of reassurance to the Australian community still anxious 
about the challenge of ‘Asia’—a promise that Australia is not 
destined to become a country at odds with its region, but a 
nation that can (in the words of the new Government White 
Paper) be ‘a winner’ in the Asian century. 
CONCLUSION SOUTHEAST ASIA AS AN ‘ASIA STRATEGY’
Major power rivalry in the Asian region has been a topic of passionate debate in 
Australia in 2012, but what action can Australia take? For all its strengths in focusing 
Australians on the opportunities offered by the economic rise of Asian countries, the 
Australian Government’s 2012 White Paper, Australia in the Asian Century, has not 
concentrated on this strategic issue. The issue will reportedly be central to the new 
Defence White Paper, scheduled for 2013. 
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This report identifies obstacles to a closer involvement in 
Southeast Asia—problems within ASEAN, and also with 
present-day Australian attitudes and habits. The White Paper 
will help on the Australian side—promoting a deeper self-
understanding as well as a greater awareness of Southeast 
Asian perspectives. A cautious assessment of the institutional 
development of ASEAN would be wise—but the progress of 
both peace and prosperity in the region demands respect. 
The argument in this report, it should be stressed, is not 
dependent on the achievement of a trouble-free ASEAN. The 
problems of the region—including the threats to ASEAN’s 
organizational unity—are a reminder, however, that Australia 
must continue to give priority to bilateral as well as multilateral 
engagement. 
The overriding argument in this report, informed by both 
ASEAN and Australian advice, is that strengthening Australia–
Southeast Asian relations—and being seen to do so—ought 
to be regarded as a key to developing an effective ‘Asia 
strategy’ for Australia. The report acknowledges that this 
is an ambitious strategy, requiring the understanding and 
support of the Australian public.. The Southeast Asian option, 
however, appears to have distinct advantages over any other. 
It is a strategy we can adopt immediately—and with few risks. 
It is a ‘third-way’ response to the question—United States or 
China? In the long term, the ASEAN choice could well be vital 
to Australia’s prosperity and security. 
—
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